COMMENT
THE EAST CHINA SEA: THE ROLE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
In the peaceful settlement of disputes between nation-states, international law mandates that each nation enter negotiations with the intent of adhering to established principles of international law or submit

the disputed issue to an international tribunal or a board of arbitration
or conciliation.'

Unfortunately, in circumstances where world opinion

is not intense with respect to a particular issue, or when a dispute arises
over a matter which is vital to a state's economic or political interests,

a nation is frequently unwilling to accede to resolution of the conflict
by a third party. Moreover, prospects for a negotiated settlement
may be dimmed by the presence of sensitive political issues in a

conflict.

An additional limitation with respect to the viability of an

international legal system of dispute resolution is that attempted reli-

ance by a nation-state upon international law may prove futile in re1. See J. BRIERLY, THE LAw OF NATIONS 71 (6th ed. 1963).
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solving international conflicts when relevant legal principles have not
been fully developed or when such principles fail to incorporate concrete guidelines necessary for the disposition of intricate legal questions.

These weaknesses of international law as a means of resolving disputes are manifested in the conflicts surrounding exploitation rights to

the continental shelf of the East China Sea and the ownership of the
Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea.

The People's Republic of

China (China), the Republic of China (Taiwan), the Republic of
Korea (South Korea), and Japan have overlapping claims to the
continental shelf beneath the East China Sea. Title to the Senkaku

Islands, in turn, is claimed by Japan, China, and Taiwan and appears
to be the immediate focal point of controversy in the East China Sea
area.
Prior to 1968, limited governmental attention was accorded the
fact that China, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan shared a common
continental shelf under the East China Sea. 2 However, a 1968 scientific survey of the East China Sea, conducted under the auspices of the
United Nations, indicated that the sea's continental shelf may contain
one of the richest oil reserves presently known.' Each nation naturally
desires to exploit the vast petroleum reserves; hence a speedy settlement

of the overlapping claims or an agreement to exploit the resources
2. Before 1968 all disputes between these nation-states centered on fishing rights in
contested waters. In each case resolution was largely accomplished through bilateral
agreements:
The seventh Japanese-Korean Conference, which convened on December 3,
1964, and resumed on January 18, 1965, resulted in a Treaty on Basic Relations, an Agreement Concerning Fisheries together with supplementary arrangements, and certain other agreements, such as those involving Property Claims
and Economic Cooperation, the Legal Status and Treatment of Koreans Residing in Japan, and Cultural Assets and Cultural Cooperation. All of these
agreements, as well as a number of related documents, were signed at Tokyo
on June 22, 1965 and entered into force on December 18, 1965, the date on
which the instruments of ratification were exchanged at Seoul. After more
than half a century the parties thus agreed to establish diplomatic relations
and after more than a decade of controversy decided to settle the fishery
dispute, at least for a period of six years. WEISSBERG 86.
Among the most unique of all international agreements are the various
Sino-Japanese fisheries agreement [sic] concluded since 1955. These agreements, although entered into by fisheries associations of the two countries,
regulate matters traditionally reserved to sovereign states, such as the delineation of fishing zones, the fixing of the number of fishing vessels permitted to
enter such zones by each party and the right to provisions and shelter in
ports. LEE 59.
3. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1970, at 65, 67, col. 2. The survey which discovered these oil deposists was conducted by Dr. K.O. Emery of the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, and the resulting Emery Report was published under the auspices
of the United Nations.
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jointly would seem to be consistent with the national interests of all
parties. 4 Despite the desirability of a settlement, principles of international law governing nation-states' rights to exploit natural resources
adjacent to their respective coasts 5 are highly imprecise. 6 In addition,
no effective method exists to insure reliance on international law for the
resolution of conflicts even when the law is relatively well settled, as is
the case with disputes concerning title to territories. The overriding
complication in effecting any settlement of these divergent claims is the
sensitive diplomatic issue of Taiwan's status in relation to China. The
conflicting claims of sovereignty advanced by Peking and Taipei pose a
political question of such magnitude that it is unlikely China would
permit a third party to resolve any question where this issue is involved, as would necessarily be the case in the dispute concerning the
East China Sea claims. In view of this specific obstacle to arbitration,
conciliation, or adjudication by an international body, resort by the
parties to direct negotiation remains a theoretical alternative, although
4. See notes 79-120 infra; notes 120-153 infra and accompanying text.
5. The potential wealth of the world's continental shelves has only recently been
fully recognized, as new techniques in exploration and exploitation have been developed.
As a result, the economic potential of the ocean's seabeds, especially the continental
shelves, and man's ability to exploit these resources are no longer matters of conjecture.
Virtually every mineral located on terrestrial surfaces can be found in more abundant
quantities in the seabeds and subsoils of the oceans. See ANDRAsSY 15-24.
The resource which seems to spark the greatest interest at present is oil. In 1969,
of the $7.1 billion generated worldwide from the mineral resources of the sea, $6.1 billion came from oil and gas. Moreover, it is anticipated that the world seabed petroleum
resources will eventually exceed those of the continents, and their value will exceed
that of all other marine resources combined. See Zacklin 84,
It should also be noted that the major American and Western European oil companies are vitally interested in an expeditious peaceful settlement of these title disputes to the East China Sea. In 1970 South Korea granted Gulf, Texaco, Chevron, and
Royal Dutch Petroleum rights to explore for oil off the coast of South Korea. The areas
covered by the leases are jointly claimed by Japan in certain instances. See N.Y. Times,
Mar. 16, 1970, at 67, col. 2. South Korea also granted Wendell Phillips Oil Company of
Honolulu an oil exploration concession in the East China Sea in an area near the Island of Kyuyu, which is also claimed by Japan. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1970, § 3 at
28, col. 7. Gulf Oil has signed an agreement with the Teikoku Oil Company of Japan for
a joint venture to explore for oil in off-shore areas around the Senkaku Islands southwest of Kyuyu Island. See N.Y. Times, June 30, 1970, at 68, col. 5. Taiwan granted
oil exploration rights to Gulf Oil for the area around the Senkaku Islands, which are
also claimed by China and Japan. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 1971, at 9, col. 1.
The United States Government has advised all American oil companies conducting
explorations in the areas contested by China that the enterprises, if they continue operations, risk seizure due to the controversies which have developed. The American government seems determined not to allow the oil dispute to disrupt the thaw in United
States-People's Republic of China relations by protecting American oil interests against
China's present claims. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1971, at 1, col. 4.
6. See notes 14-29 infra and accompanying text.
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this approach appears somewhat improbable, since neither China nor
Taiwan extends recognition to the other.
This Comment will focus on the conflicting legal claims in the East
China Sea controversies, viewed in the context of the effectiveness of
international legal principles and the established means of peaceful
resolution of disputes. It will be demonstrated that regardless of
whether the body of pertinent international law is imprecise, as with
the law of the continental shelf and territorial sea, or refined, as with
the settlement of title disputes,7 economic and political interests may
predominate and undermine prospects for settlement based solely on
the principles of international law at issue. The conflicts surrounding
sovereign control over the mineral resources beneath the East China
Sea and title to the Senkaku Islands provide excellent case-studies of
the role of international law in the settlement of disputes between Asian
nations when the economic and political stakes are substantial.
THE LAW OF

THE TERRITORIAL SEA AND THE

CONTINENTAL SHELF

The extent of each nation-state's jurisdiction and exclusive sovereignty over the seas has been a source of considerable diplomatic
and scholarly controversy for centuries.8 A recent attempt to infuse order into this body of law was evidenced by the 1958 Geneva Conventions, produced at the United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea.9 Despite acceptance of the accords by numerous countries, the
considerable ambiguity in specific provisions of the Geneva Conven7. See text accompanying notes 80-81
8. Over 300 years ago, Grotius, the Dutch legal scholar and theologian, espoused
the theory of the free sea
and the English jurist Selden promoted the
case for a closed sea
H. GROTTuS, MAnn LMERUM (1604)
J. SELDEN, MARE CLAUSUM (1605). While technological advances have led to a
revision of commonly held notions of the definition of the sea, the legal and political
problems remain the same: determining the extent of a state's national jurisdiction.
After a century of developing law by custom and practice, a relatively small number
of nations developed the standard three-mile limitation on the exclusive sovereignty of
any state over the sea contiguous to its shores. At present, the competing claims of the
127 member-nations of the United Nations have given rise to a political and legal
problem of a magnitude never before experienced in this area.
Zacklin 79.
9. Convention on the Continental Shelf, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L.55 (1958).
Dean,
52 AM. J. INT'L L. 607 (1958); Jessup,
COLum. L. REv.234 (1959); Whiteman,
52 AM. J. INT'L L. 629 (1958); Young,
52 AM. J. INTL L.
733 (1958); Young,
AM. J. It'L L.
(1961).
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tions has encouraged the proliferation of contradictory claims asserted
by nation-states under the rubric of international law--conflicts which
have grown more intense with the discovery of new sources of needed
minerals and resources in the seabeds and with the concurrent development of technological methods necessary to exploit such resources.
The traditional maritime states of Great Britain, the Netherlands,
Japan, and the United States support the standard three-to-twelve-mile
limits prescribed by customary international law for a state's territorial
sea, 10 whereas the Latin and South American states, along with China,
presently claim a 200-mile territorial sea and shelf area." Predictions
of vast economic wealth stored in the continental shelves have sparked
increased national interest in these areas. This has served to reinforce
the reluctance of many developing nations, already wary of the designs
of more technologically advanced countries upon the seabed areas near
their coasts, to submit disputes regarding the extent of their territorial
seas to international solution-a solution which might be governed by
10. See Zacklin 80. The major maritime states, which commanded enough strength
to limit each state's territorial sea to three miles prior to World War II, had already
slipped into the minority position by the time of the 1958 Geneva Conference. At the
Conference, the basic struggle was over the advisability of a six- or twelve-mile limit on
the territorial sea. No compromise was reached at the Conference, however, and an
outer boundary was not established. Nevertheless, Article 24 of the Convention on the
Territorial Sea allowed each state to claim a contiguous zone which extended a maximum of twelve miles, thereby effectively limiting the extent of the territorial sea to
twelve miles:
Art. 24. 1. In a zone of the high seas contiguous to its territorial sea,
the coastal State may exercise the control necessary to:
(a) Prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary
regulations within its territory or territorial sea;
(b) Punish infringement of the above regulations committed within its
territory or territorial sea.
2. The contiguous zone may not extend beyond twelve miles from the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured . . . . Convenvention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, art. 24, U.N. Doe.
A/CONF. 13/L.52 (1958).
Also, the standard geologic definition of the continental shelf and that used in the
1958 Convention do not coincide. Geologists generally define the continental shelf as
that shallow part of the sea bottom which is adjacent to the land mass up to the point
where the gradient becomes steep, at which point the continental shelf ends and the
continental slope begins. However, the definition utilized in the Convention speaks in
terms of a continental shelf which extends to a point where the water measures 200
meters, regardless of whether the geologic continental shelf extends to a depth of more
or less than 200 meters. ANOPRASSY 3-14.
11. In 1952, Peru, Chile, and Ecuador signed the Declaration of Santiago on the
Maritime Zone, which declared that each signatory possessed sole sovereignty over the
sea adjacent to its coast and extending not less than 200 miles from such coast. At a
conference in Lima, Peru in 1954, Honduras, El Salvador, and Costa Rica joined in claiming exclusive sovereignty over a 200-mile zone. See ANDRAssY 42-43. See also DocumENTs 345-55 (texts of the declarations).
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definitions of the territorial sea established by the traditional maritime
states.' 2 In short, the 200-mile territorial sea limit, with concomitant
control over that extent of the continental shelf, has been unilaterally
adopted by developing nations in the hope of garnering an ample share
of marine and shelf resources.' 3 As a result of the cleavage in views
between the traditional maritime states and emerging nation-states, the
law of the sea has become a highly important and sensitive issue.
More particularly, development of the requisite technology needed to
exploit the resources of the seabeds has greatly enhanced the importance of the law pertaining to national sovereignty over the ocean floor.
General Development and Status of the Law of the Continental Shelf
Unlike rules of law relating to a nation-state's territorial sea,
principles of international law applicable to the continental shelf and
the resources of the seabed are of relatively recent origin. Prior to the
development of technological capabilities needed to exploit the seabed,
international law was silent as to the proprietorship of the continental
shelf, since, of course, no practical necessity for devising a rule of law
existed. In view of the dearth of legal principles with respect to the
continental shelf, it is generally argued that, after technology necessary
for exploitation was developed, claims by nation-states of exclusive
jurisdiction over shelf areas could not, in principle, be deemed illegal
under international law.' 4 When numerous states followed suit by
claiming sovereign control over areas of the seabeds, the practice
thereby established became customary international law.'6
With respect to national rights to the continental shelf, President
Truman established the basic international precedent, which was sub12. The optimistic forecasts of natural wealth in the seas led to a definite trend
toward "creeping nationalism" among the developing nations. See Knight, Law of the
Seas Negotiations, 1971-1972-from Internationalism to Nationalism, 9 SAN DiEco L.
REv. 383, 389 (1972).
13. Emerging nations suspect the imperialistic motives of proponents of the traditional limits of a state's area of exclusive jurisdiction, since the economic superpowers
possess the economic and technological capabilities for exploiting these resources. See
T. KOBAYASHI, THE ANGLO-NORWEGIAN FISHERIES CASE OF 1961 AND THE CHANGm
LAW OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA 14 (1965). See also PEKING REV., Mar. 10, 1972, at 16.

14. See ANDRAssY 64. By 1950 nineteen states had claimed sovereign control
over the adjacent submarine areas, and no protests had been lodged. By 1957 six
more states had followed suit, including South Korea. By 1960 no more than thirty-five
states had registered specific claims. Nevertheless, largely based on the assertions of
the 1958 Geneva Conventions, it was generally accepted that no declaration was necessary and that the adjacent submarine areas belonged to the coastal state ipso lure.
See Z. SLOUKA, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM AND THE CONTINENTAL SHELF 26-27 (1968).
15. See ANDRASSY 64.
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sequently followed by a majority of nations-albeit with numerous
variations-when he declared by proclamation in 1945 that the United
States,
[h]aving concern for the urgency of conserving and prudently utilizing
its natural resources. . . regards the natural resources of the subsoil and
sea bed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous to
the coasts of the United States as appertaining to the United States, subject to its jurisdiction and control .... 16

Generally, a lengthy period of time is required for a rule of customary international law to develop; but as Professor Lauterpacht has
argued, the absence of protests which accompanied the widespread

claims to sovereignty over the continental shelf following President
Truman's proclamation signaled the world community's general ac-

quiescence, which, in turn, gave rise to a new rule of international
law.'" In addition, the view was soon accepted that an official governmental statement expressly claiming sovereign rights to exploit adjacent

seabeds was not legally required to justify a state's claim.' s
However, controversy soon arose with respect to the permissible

area of the continental shelf over which a nation-state could exert sovereign control. As a result of international confusion over the
extent of exclusive national control, the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf was promulgated in an effort to provide guidelines for
signatory nations.' 9 The Convention recognizes that all coastal states,
16. DEP'T STATE BULL. No. 327, Proclamation Concerning United States Jurisdiction over Natural Resources in Coastal Areas and the High Seas 484, 485 (1945).
The United States Proclamation dealt with the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil of the continental shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous to the United States.
No claim to full sovereignty was made which affected the character of the high seas and
the rights of free passage and navigation. See Exec. Order No. 9633, 10 Fed. Reg.
12,305 (1945).
Prior to the Truman Proclamation, various jurists and publicists had promoted
similar theories. But it is generally conceded that the Proclamation was the beginning
of the positive law on the subject. Thereafter, this concept of the coastal state's having
a vested right in the continental shelf off its shores soon prevailed over all competing theories. According to the Truman Proclamation, all disputes pertaining to overlapping claims were to be settled by mutual agreement according to principles of
equity, and this basic pattern has prevailed subsequently in the proclamations of other
states and in the settlement of disputes which have arisen. North Seas Continental
Shelf Cases, [1969] I.C.J. 33. See generally Bingham, The Continental Shelf and the
MarginalBelt, 40 AM. J. INT'L L. 173 (1946).
17. See Lauterpacht, Sovereignty over Submarine Areas, 27 Barr. Y.B. INT'L. L.
376, 393-95 (1950). See also Meeting of June 26, 1953, I Y.B. oF THE INT'L L.
COMM'N 59, 63, 68, 122, 257, 261, 266 (1953).
18. See ODA 151.
19. The 1958 Conference on the Law of the Sea was called to deal with "the problems relathig to the high seas, territorial waters, contiguous zones, the continental
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with or without a specific proclamation, have sovereign rights over the
contiguous continental shelf for purposes of exploring and exploiting
the natural resources located therein.2" In a critical provision, the Convention defines the continental shelf as
the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but
outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres, or beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superlacent waters admits of
the exploitation of the naturalresourcesof the said areas ....21

Unfortunately, the Convention accomplished little with respect to
settling controversies existing at the time of its promulgation because of

the open-ended nature of the accord's definition of the continental
shelf. Indeed, the Convention itself generated new disputes. With the
development of improved techniques of seabed exploration to depths

not envisioned when the Convention was written,22 the "exploitability"
clause contained in the definition of "continental shelf" opened the

possibility of national claims of sovereignty to the deepest troughs of
the ocean.

Obviously, such extensive claims were not intended to be

shelf and the adjacent waters" based upon the completion of comprehensive preliminary studies as directed by a General Assembly resolution. G.A. Res. 899 (IX), 6
U.N. GAOR Supp. 21, at 50, U.N. Doe. A/2890 (1954). See 1958 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Vol. 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/38, at 1 (1958). The
Convention on the Continental Shelf was adopted by a vote of 57 to 3, with 8 abstentions, on April 29, 1958. It came into force on June 10, 1964. Id. See DOCUMENTS
20 (text of the Convention).
20. Article 2 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf provides: "The rights
of the coastal State over the continental shelf do not depend on occupation, effective
or notional, or on any express proclamation." U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L.55 (1958).
21. Article 1, Convention on the Continental Shelf (emphasis added). Id.
Various interpretations have been accorded this section of the Convention. One
school of thought is that the Conference intended the definition to cover only the geologic shelf, which normally ends at 200 meters, thereby allowing exploitation of only
those areas relatively near the shore. Other observers contend that the intent of
the Convention is to allow exploitation of whatever territory is exploitable, whether it
is the shelf, slope, or continental rise. This latter view seems to be the most popular
at present.
The United States has gone far beyond the 200-meter limit in continental shelf and
slope exploitation. International mining activity in this regard has been aggressive,
stretching out past the 200-meter mark wherever possible. See Krueger, Background
of the Doctrine of the Continental Shelf and Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 10 NATURAL REsouRcE J.442, 479 (1970).
22. At the time the Convention was written, undersea exploration and exploitation
could not be conducted at a depth deeper than a maximum of 280 meters. Moreover, it
was not anticipated that technology would develop as rapidly as it has in the recent past.
Presently, it is anticipated that by 1974 the petroleum industry will have a capacity to
drill and produce in depths of approximately 1500 meters. By 1979 it should be possible to develop the technology needed to drill to 6000 meters. See generally Auburn, The
InternationalSeabed Area, 20 INT'L & Com'. L.Q. 173, 174-75 (1971).
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legitimized by the signatories when the Convention was executed; but a
literal reading of this provision of the accord would permit coastal
states to extend their claims of sovereign control over seabed areas to

the middle of the ocean, thereby potentially creating overlapping national claims as well as establishing vast areas of national monopoliza23
tion.
Difficulties resulting from the "exploitability" clause of article 124
of the Geneva Convention are multiplied in circumstances where overlapping claims to the continental shelf are made by adjacent or opposite neighbor-states. In such situations, article 625 of the Convention
mandates that boundary lines of claims to the continental shelf shall
be determined by agreement between the concerned nations.2 6 However, in the absence of an agreement, the boundary of the continental
shelf is to be the median line between the claimant states ("every point
of which is equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines . . ."),
23. See ANDRASSY 84-90. The possibility that the 200-meter standard of the Convention, when coupled with the "exploitability" clause, might become inadequate was
pointed out to the Conference when the standard was promulgated. However, the state
of maritime technology at that time was relatively primitive; hence, there was a widespread refusal to believe that such technology would develop as rapidly as it did in
the mid-sixties.
Certain delegates anticipated that the "exploitabiity" option would only be utilized in exceptional circumstances, but any standard legal construction of the section
would not allow such a limitation. Therefore, with the present and future capabilities
of exploration, a state's sovereign control over those areas of seabed adjacent to its
coast may be extended to the middle of the ocean, as long as the area is exploitable
with the technology which is then available. This development was certainly not anticipated by the drafters of the Convention. See generally C. CoLoNMos, INTERNATIONAL
LAw OF THE SEA 70 (1967).
24. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
25. Article 6 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf provides:
1. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two
or more States whose coasts are opposite each other, the boundary of the continental shelf appertaining to such States shall be determined by agreement between them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is
justified by special circumstances, the boundary is the median line, every
point of which is equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines from
which the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is measured.
2. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two
adjacent States, the boundary of the continental shelf shall be determined by
agreement between them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another
boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the boundary shall be determined by application of the principle of equidistance from the nearest points
of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is
measured.
3. In delimiting the boundaries of the continental shelf, any lines which
are drawn in accordance with the principles set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 of
this article should be defined with reference to charts and geographical features
as they exist at a particular date, and reference should be made to fixed permanent identifiable points on the land. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L55 (1958).
26. See id. (article 6, section 1 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf).
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unless another boundary line is justified by "special circumstances.

27

Inherent in the basic standards of "median line" and "special circumstances" are numerous areas of confusion since no precise legal criteria
were established to determine such basic points as the meaning of

"opposite" or "adjacent" coasts.28

The problem of inadequate and

ambiguous guidelines becomes even more complicated when the disputants are not parties to the Geneva Convention.20
27. See id. (article 6, sections 1 and 2 of the Convention on the Continental
Shelf); Grisel, The LateralBoundaries of the Continental Shelf and the Judgment of the
InternationalCourt of Justice in the North Seas ContinentalShelf Cases, 64 AM. I. INT'L
L. 562 (1970). Dr. Grisel maintains that
this proviso was adopted because the framers of the convention felt that
the application of the equidistance principle would not be satisfactory in all
cases and that exceptions to the rule should therefore be provided. But the
preparatory work gives little information upon the content of the concept of
"special circumstances," the definition of which is absent in Article 6. Two extreme interpretations of the notion are conceivable. One accords with the ratio
legis just mentioned: special circumstances may be said to exist in any case
where the equidistance line has inappropriate effects. The other relies rather
on the formulation of Article 6: since the "circumstances" must be "special"
and "justify" a departure from the principle, in order to be taken into account, they may be regarded as present only in quite exceptional situations,
where the drawing of an equidistance line would be infeasible. Id. at 581.
The International Court of Justice in the North Seas Cases did not expressly address this issue. However, the entire tenor of the opinion indicates that the court
favors a broad interpretation of the clause. The international tribunal mandated the settlement of all disputes according to "equitable principles," a standard which is indeed
vague. The valid test to establish the existence of a "special circumstance," according
to the court, is whether the application of the equidistance principle would lead to inequitable results in the particular case at hand. Such a standard implies a liberal construction of the "escape clause." Id. at 582.
Thus, the "special circumstances" clause covers a wide range of situations
where the application of the equidistance principle would lead to inequitable
results. It is therefore likely to have the following consequences: In almost
every case, the country which does not find the equidistance line satisfactory
will be entitled to allege that a departure from the rule is justified. There
will then be only two ways to avoid conflicting claims. Either the parties
reach an agreement on the delimitation of the boundary line or they submit
their dispute to arbitration. Since no definite criteria apply in the matter,
except the test of "equity" laid down by the International Court of Justice, the
arbitrators will be in a position to adjudicate ex aequo et bona. Id. at 583-84.
See generally Ely, Seabed Boundaries Between Coastal States: The Effect To Be
Given Islets as "Special Circumstances," 6 INT'L LAw. 219 (1972).
28. See Grisel, supra note 27, at 577-84.
29. Id. at 563.
Most countries have not yet ratified the Convention on the Continental
Shelf, and the question thus arises as to what rules are applicable to the drawing of the lateral boundaries when one or both of the parties are not bound by
that convention. Such was the situation in the North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases between Germany on the one hand and Denmark and The Netherlands
on the other, which were recently decided by the International Court of Justice. The waters of the North Sea are shallow, and the whole bottom may be
regarded as continental shelf, the western part of which incontestably belongs
to Great Britain. The eastern part must be divided between Norway, Denmark,
the Federal Republic of Germany, The Netherlands, Belgium, and France.
Germany concluded a convention with each of its neighbors (Denmark and
The Netherlands), which delimited the boundary of the shelf in the immediate
vicinity of the coast according to the principle of equidistance. Both Den-
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The Geneva Accord and Customary Law: The Impact of the North
Seas Cases
Notwithstanding the ambiguities in the 1958 accord, an issue
emerges as to whether the provisions of the Convention have been so
generally accepted by the community of nations as to be considered

customary international law and therefore binding on nonsignatories.
The International Court of Justice in the North Seas Continental Shelf

Cases, a decision involving a controversy among West Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands over claims to the continental shelf under
the North Sea, determined that the principle of equidistance contained
in the Convention had not become "an inescapable principle a priori

accompaniment of basic continental shelf doctrine."30

On the con-

trary, the court deemed the principle to be purely conventional; and,
therefore, nonsignatory states are not bound by the standards of the
Geneva accords. 3 ' In addition, while determining that the parties in the
case were not required to apply either the 1958 Convention or the equidistance method, the international tribunal held that there are still principles of law to be applied in resolving disputes over the continental shelf,
32
namely the application of "equitable principles.
mark and The Netherlands wished the prolongation of the frontier lines seaward to be made under the same rule. The Federal Republic disagreed with
that view, since the lines thus drawn would meet at a relatively short distance from its coast and thereby considerably narrow its portion of the North
Sea continental shelf. After unfruitful negotiations the parties decided to submit the dispute to the International Court of Justice. Germany concluded with
each of its opponents a Special Agreement, Article 1 of which requested the
Court to decide:
What principles and rules of international law are applicable to the delimitations between the Parties of the areas of the continental shelf in the
North Sea which appertain to each of them beyond the partial boundary
determined by the above mentioned Convention . . .? Id.
See North Seas Continental Shelf Cases, [1969] I.C.J. 4.
30. North Seas Continental Shelf Cases, [1969] I.C.J. 32.
31. Id. at 41. The International Court of Justice reasoned that "
the Geneva Convention did not embody or crystallize any pre-existing or
emergent rule of customary law, according to which the delimitation of continental shelf areas between adjacent States must, unless the Parties otherwise
agree, be carried out on an equidistance-special circumstances basis. A rule
was of course embodied in Article 6 of the Convention, but as a purely conventional rule. Whether it has since acquired a broader basis remains to be seen:
qua conventional rule however, as has already been concluded, it is not opposable to the Federal Republic. Id.
32. Id. at 46-47. It has been argued that it is inappropriate to require states to submit to arbitration when there are no specific controlling rules of international law available which would be dispositive of the controversy. Without any such guidelines,
the arbitrators would be able to exercise a wide degree of discretion. While states
might freely submit to such arbitration, most nations would undoubtedly be reluctant
to arbitrate significant issues when the primary principles of law being applied were
only vague concepts of equity. See Grisel, supra note 27, at 591.
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In articulating these "equitable principles," the International Court
established three exceedingly broad standards to aid in negotiating the
settlement of a dispute. First, nation-states are obliged to enter nego-

tiations with a view toward arriving at an agreement.38 Second, all
relevant circumstances are to be taken into account by the parties in
effecting a settlement, which is to be based on equitable principles.

4

Third, and more concretely, the recognized continental shelf of any
state must be the natural prolongation of its terrestrial body and must

not infringe upon any similar prolongation of another state.8
Despite the International Court's formulation of three general

principles with respect to settling disputes concerning the continental
shelf, it is apparent that the "generality of practice" required to establish a rule of international law still has not been achieved. As of 1969,
at least ninety-eight states had asserted widely divergent claims of
jurisdiction over the offshore resources of the continental shelf, with
thirty-seven of these countries having claimed sovereignty over areas
going deeper than the two-hundred-meter standard established by the

Geneva Convention. 8 Emerging nations, fearing increased domination by technologically advanced countries, have generally laid claim to

very extensive areas of the seabed.3 7 As justification for such expansive claims, the developing states have viewed the North Seas Cases as
a declaration of independence from the 200-meter standard of the

1958 Convention. 8
33. North Seas Continental Shelf Cases, [1969] I.C.J. 47.
34. Id. at 47, 49-50. The court was careful to note that equity does not necessarily
coincide with equality.
35. Id. at 47. The International Court found that in each case:
(A) the use of the equidistance method of delimitation not being obligatory as between the Parties; and
(B) there being no other single method of delimitation the use of which is
in all circumstances obligatory;
(C) the principles and rules of international law applicable to the delimitation ..
of the areas of the continental shelf ..
are as follows:
(1) delimitation is to be effected by agreement in accordance with
equitable principles, and taking account of all the relevant circumstances, in
such a way as to leave as much as possible to each Party all those parts of the
continental shelf that constitute a natural prolongation of its land territory
into and under the sea, without encroachment on the natural prolongation of
the land territory of the other;
(2) if, in the application of the preceding sub-paragraph, the delimitation leaves to the Parties areas that overlap, these are to be divided between
them in agreed proportions or, failing agreement, equally, unless they decide
on a regime of joint jurisdiction, user, or exploitation for the zones of overlap or any part of them. . . . Id. at 53.
36. See Krueger, supra note 21, at 479.
37. See notes 11-13 supra and accompanying text.
38. See T. KOBAYASHr, supra note 13, at 48-49. Mr. Kobayashi finds an almost
total disregard for the "international aspect" of the problems of delimitation and territorial jurisdiction. Relying also on Justice Alvarez's concurring opinion in the Anglo-
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As a result of widespread confusion and continuing disputes, 9
most countries have recognized the inadequacy of the Geneva Convention, largely due to the open-ended nature of the "exploitability"
clause. Consequently, in 1970, the United Nations General Assembly
decided to convene a Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1973 to be
charged with the task of establishing international machinery to regulate equitably the exploitation of the resources of the ocean floor beyond what are determined to be the limits of national jurisdiction."'
As a guideline for the Conference, the General Assembly adopted a
"Declaration of Principles," which asserted that the seabed underlying
the high seas is not subject to appropriation by individual states and,
indeed, that exploitation should be regulated by an international or41
gan.
Nonvegian Fisheries Cases, [1961] I.C.J. 114, 145, the smaller states have given their
self-interest full expression by applying liberal criteria in the delimination of their area
of sovereign jurisdiction. This situation is viewed as a reaction to the "colonial domination" imposed in the past by Great Britain, Japan, Germany, the United States, and
other Western nations in the name of the freedom of the seas. Id.
39. The ensuing confusion prompted Ambassador Prado of Malta to raise again before the United Nations-less than six years ago-the issue of the seabeds. Most of the
Geneva Conventions promulgated in 1958 had just recently come into force when Ambassador Prado posed the issue of the law of the sea in the United Nations: the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone came into force in 1964; the High
Seas, in 1962; the Continental Shelf, in 1964; and the Fishing and the Conservation of the
Living Resources of the High Seas, in 1962. Most observers still assumed that these
Conventions would be dispositive of any conflicts which would arise. However, it had
already become apparent to Ambassador Prado that a complete restructuring of these
Conventions was needed to deal with the rapid advances in technology which had destroyed the efficacy of the 1958 Conventions. See Zacklin 80.
40. Id. at 80-81. While the members of the United Nations seem to be anxious to establish an international regime to regulate the world's seabeds, private business is generally wary of this approach. In view of the desire for secure investments, business interests would prefer having some sort of national control so that there would be a more
familiar method of recourse should disputes arise. In general, big business is uncertain of the stability of any regime of this sort under the auspices of the United Nations.
See Auburn, The Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Bill, 9 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 491,
494-95 (1972).
See generally Eichelberger, The United Nations and the Bed of the Sea, 6 SAN
DIEGo L. Rnv. 339 (1969); Knight, supra note 12.

See also G. MANGONE,

THE

(1972).
41. G.A. Res. 2749, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 28, at 24, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/L.544
(1970). Resolution 2749 (XXV) provides in part:
The General Assembly,
Recalling its resolutions 2340 (XXII) of 18 December 1967, 2467
(XXIII) of 21 December 1968 and 2574 (XXIV) of 15 December 1969, concerning the area to which the title of the item refers,
Affirming that there is an area of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and the
subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, the precise limits
of which are yet to be determined,
Recognizing that the existing legal regime of the high seas does not pro-

UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND THE BED OF THE SEAS
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Notwithstanding the general concurrence of member-states in the

guidelines set forth in the "Declaration of Principles," there exist highly
complicated issues to be settled by the eighty-six-member Sea-Bed
Committee, established by the General Assembly to complete prelimi-

nary groundwork prior to the Conference itself. For example, the extent of a state's territorial sea, the extent of a country's exclusive jurisdiction over the continental shelf, and the issue of whether national

economic control should be exclusive in nature or subject to international regulation are vigorously contested questions. 42

As -indicated,

developing states urge the existence of a 200-mile zone of exclusive
control with respect to both the territorial sea and the continental shelf,

but countries with sophisticated technological capabilities contend that
the area of exclusive jurisdiction over the territorial sea should be restricted to a maximum limit of twelve miles and that control of the
seabeds should be limited to that area geologically identifiable as the
vide substantive rules for regulating the exploration of the aforesaid area and
the exploitation of its resources,
Convinced that the area shall be reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes
and that the exploration of the area and the exploitation of its resources
shall be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole,
Believing it essential that an international regime applying to the area
and its resources and including appropriate international machinery should
be established as soon as possible,
Bearing in mind that the development and use of the area and its resources shall be undertaken in such a manner as to foster the healthy development of the world economy and balanced growth of international trade, and
to minimize any adverse economic effects caused by the fluctuation of prices
of raw materials resulting from such activities,
Solemnly declaresthat:
1. The sea-bed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction (hereinafter referred to as the area), as well
as the resources of the area, are the common heritage of mankind.
2. The area shall not be subject to appropriation by any means by States
or persons, natural or juridical, and no State shall claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part thereof.
7. The exploration of the area and the exploitation of its resources shall
be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole, irrespective of the geographical location of States, whether land-locked or coastal, and taking into particular consideration the interests and needs of the developing countries.
9. On the basis of the principles of this Declaration, an international regime applying to the area and its resources and including appropriate international machinery to give effect to its provisions shall be established by an international treaty of a universal character, generally agreed upon. The regime
shall, inter alia, provide for the orderly and safe development and rational
management of the area and its resources and for expanding opportunities in
the use thereof and ensure the equitable sharing by States in the benefits
derived therefrom, taking into particular consideration the interests and needs
of the developing countries, whether landlocked or coastal.
See generally Gorove, The Concept of "Common Heritage of Mankind": A Political,
Moral or Legal Innovation? 9 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 390 (1972); Sohn, The Council of
an InternationalSea-Bed Authority, 9 SAN DIEGo L. Rlv. 404 (1972).
42. See generally Stevenson, Who Is To Control the Oceans: U.S. Policy and the
1973 Law of the Sea Conference, 6 INT'L LAw. 465 (1972).
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continental shelf.43 Moreover, the possible nature and authority of
the international regulatory organ which is to be established varies
greatly among the nations submitting proposals.4
In short, the entire
field of the law of the sea seems to be in disarray," and the prospects
for effecting an international consensus seem slight.4 6
THE LAW OF THE SEA: VIEws OF STATES
BORDERING THE EAST CHINA SEA

Considerable tension among nations bordering the East China Sea
has resulted, at least in part, from the absence of authoritative principles
of international law governing the extent of a nation-state's continental
shelf and the dearth of standards to be applied in settling overlapping
claims by states sharing the same shelf area. Of the four nation-states,
only Taiwan has signed the 1958 Geneva Convention pertaining to the
continental shelf. 47 In addition, while Japan has established diplomatic
relations with China and South Korea, China does not recognize either
Taiwan or South Korea. Therefore, initiation of four-party negotiations to settle the conflicting claims to the continental shelf is seemingly impossible under present circumstances. However, an examination of present policy positions of the four countries involved in the
East China Sea disputes will aid in analyzing areas of potential agreement between these competing states should they eventually attempt to
resolve their controversy through an established means of peacefully
settling international disputes.
43. Id. at 472.
44. See DOCUMENTS 73-231 (texts of the various proposals).
45. After viewing the dearth of progress reached by the preliminary planning sessions thus far, certain commentators have urged that the General Assembly should exercise its reserved option of postponing the 1973 Conference due to the unlikelihood
of reaching any accord. See Butte, The Law of the Sea-Breakers Ahead, 6 INT'L
I.4w. 237, 240-41 (1972).
Not all commentators agree with Mr. Butte. While admitting that the unsolved
problems are legion, and seemingly insurmountable, they insist that the Conference
should be held as scheduled in order to force the various nation-states to make the
difficult decisions and commitments at the present time. According to this view, delay would only increase the proliferation of unilateral claims; coastal states will grow
anxious to begin to exploit their offshore resources; and the present exploitation by
the more technologically advanced countries will increase rapidly-all of which will
tend to complicate the issues further. See Stevenson, supra note 42, at 477.
46. The potential wealth of the seabeds has given rise to divergent claims. Many
states, moreover, are simply unwilling to restrict the extent of their present claims for
the benefit of their less geographically fortunate neighbors who have little or no coastline. See ADRnAssY 99-107.
47. See text accompanying notes 65-69 infra.
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Japan: Freedom of Exploration and an International Regulatory Regime
Prior to technological breakthroughs permitting exploitation of
the ocean floor, Japan's concern in regard to the law of the sea centered on curbing extensive national claims over territorial waters in order to enhance free mobility of Japanese fishing interests. Similarly,
with the advent of technological means of seabed exploitation, the offi-

cial position of Japan with respect to control of the continental shelf
has been motivated by its intense desire to prevent national monopolization of vast areas of the ocean floor in order to maximize Japanese
opportunities for worldwide exploitation of sea resources.48 In this re-

gard, Japan refused to support adoption of the 1958 Geneva Convention and favored instead the utilization of seabed resources for the
benefit of mankind.4 9

In particular, the "exploitability" criterion es-

tablished by the Geneva accord was opposed by the Japanese due to
the potential for extension of national claims beyond the depth of 200

meters and, consequently, over ever-increasing distances as new
technology was developed. 0 As a substitute for the vague contours
established by the Convention, Japan advocated the creation of an in-

ternational regime for governing exploration and exploitation of marine resources. 51

Japan's desire to prevent the proliferation of unilateral claims by
nations over the ocean floor has been intensified by its expanding need
for petroleum resources. Japan is presently dependent on oil for

seventy percent of its energy needs, a factor which makes it the largest
oil importer in the world.52 As its energy requirements increase, Japan
48. See ODA 25-35. Initially, Japan's primary concern was the protection of its
fishing industry. Japan's massive fishing fleet has been involved in conflicts with many
states, including China, Indonesia, South Korea, and the Soviet Union. Japan's fishermen are highly aggressive, refusing to respect the extended areas claimed by these
states past the three-mile limit acknowledged by Japan. As a result, several thousand
Japanese ships have been seized in the waters held exclusively by these states. In each
case, the Japanese government has had to negotiate an understanding or working agreement with the other country in order to insure the return of the Japanese ships and fishermen. Id.
49. See 6 U.N. GAOR, Conference on the Law of the Sea 14, 47 (1958).
50. See ODA 167.
51. See 6 U.N. GAOR, Conference on the Law of the Sea 14, 47, 56 (1958).
52. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1972, § 3, at 5, col. 1. Japan's pressing need for oil
reserves is forcing her into the highly competitive field of oil exploration. While Japan normally prefers to trade in the world community without incurring any sort of political liabilities, it appears that the quest for oil is dragging Japan onto the world stage
as it competes for the exploration rights to many of the large oil reserves presently
known around the world. Former Premier Eisaku Sato aptly noted that "power is the
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is anxious to find new petroleum sources, as well as to keep newly discovered deposits in the continental shelf open to exploitation by

nations with adequate technological capabilities.53
While Japan's interest in maritime nations' rights has expanded

from a singular desire to protect its fishing industry to encompass a
policy to maximize the exploitation of mineral resources contained in
the continental shelf, its policy position has remained consistent and
has proved to be well designed to serve Japan's national interests.

Thus, Dr. Shigeru Oda, Japan's foremost authority on the law of the
sea, has consistently espoused a philosophy of international control of

the seabeds:
[T]he question of the utilization of the seas must be carefully distinguished from the question of the jurisdiction of the State. It has been
overlooked by many scholars that denial of a regime of the continental
shelf by the coastal State, as the author is proposing, does not necessarily
mean the prohibition of the exploitation itself of submarine areas. 54

Dr. Oda has also promoted the concept of an international regime regulating exploitation of the ocean floor of the deep sea, as distinct from
the continental shelf (assuming the exploitability criterion in the Ge-

neva Convention is eventually rejected), thereby releasing deep sea
areas from the exclusive control of adjoining states. 55 However, Professor Oda acknowledges that it is presently useless to view seabeds as
being "beyond" the continental shelf, within the meaning of the Geneva Convention, since all seabed areas can conceivably be included as

part of the continental shelf under the exploitability clause of article 1.56
key-oil and nuclear power-for the next 30 years"; and Japan is eyeing the oil reserves of the world reaching from the East China Sea and the Pacific Basin, from
Peru and Ecuador to Alaska and the United States, Siberia, Indonesia, and the Straits of
Malacca. Id.
53. Japan has the necessary capital to invest in developing new oil sites. In addition, Japan is independently developing the most modem technology which is needed,
so that it will not have to rely in the future on the oil giants of America and Western
Europe. Id. at 1, col. 1.
54. ODA 151.
55. See W. BuRnYE, TowARDS A BEtrER USE OF m OcEAN 198 (1969) (remarks of
Dr. Shigeru Oda). This approach will allow Japan greater access to the seabeds of the
world than would otherwise be possible if states were allowed to extend their exclusive jurisdiction beyond the continental shelf to the maximum extent existing technology would allow. Dr. Oda has explained:
I do not suggest that as lex ferenda, the deep sea should be divided among
the various coastal States. On the contrary, I am inclined to support the view
that, as lex ferenda, the regime of the ocean floor of the deep sea should be
distinct from that of the continental shelf, thus releasing deep sea areas from
the exclusive control of the coastal States which they adjoin. In other words,
coastal submarine areas should remain under the control of the coastal State
as elements of the continental shelf, but the deep sea areas beneath the
ocean should be treated differently. In order to realize this policy for deep
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Pursuant to this fundamental policy of seeking the internationalization of the vast majority of ocean seabeds, Japan in 1971 submitted
its "Outline of a Convention on the International Sea-Bed Regime and
7
Machinery" for consideration by a United Nations committee.

While the Japanese proposal fails to define specifically the parameters
of the international seabed, the measure does propose the establishment

of an international body which would grant exploration and development licenses to petitioning states. According to the plan, the international organ would distribute revenues from exploitation of seabed

resources among member-nations, with special consideration being
given to developing nations.5 8 Logically, as a state with severely limited

natural resources but with financial and technological capabilities, Japan desires to limit to the greatest extent possible the area of the sea-

beds controlled by numerous coastal states through claims of exclusive
sovereignty and thus to ensure opportunities for worldwide exploration

by Japanese interests, subject to control by a proposed international
regime.
China: Sanction of Extensive National Claims
Notwithstanding the fact that it has a coastline of 3500 miles,

China controls a smaller share of the continental shelf than such small
sea areas, it is essential that the Continental Shelf Convention be revised,
thus leaving the way open to free the deep sea areas from the exclusive control of the coastal State. Careful thought must still be given to whether
the 200-meters depth is an appropriate criterion for determining the line between the continental shelf under the control of the coastal State and other
deep sea areas free from such control. Id. (remarks of Dr. Oda).
Japan is also promoting the idea that states should develop and exploit the natural
resources of their adjoining seabeds through leases to technologically advanced states if
the coastal state does not possess the needed technology or capital reserves. Naturally,
Japan would be in an ideal position to "assist" such states. Id. at 197.
56. See 22 U.N. GAOR, at 42, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV 1515 (1967). If each state
were allowed to extend its area of exclusive control even as much as 200 miles, which
would be less than if each state could claim sovereign jurisdiction over the maximum
exploitable area, the total seabed area of the world open for exploration and exploitation
on a random basis would be reduced by thirty to fifty percent. Japan has the resources
and technology to exploit these areas presently; but if such expanded claims are allowed
to stand, Japan's potential for employment of these resources is severely reduced.
Therefore, Japan stands to profit greatly if the area over which a state can claim exclusive jurisdiction is substantially limited. In the alternative, if the deep seabeds other
than those included in the continental shelves are put under international control, Japan also stands to profit as one of the few states possessing the technology needed to
develop these mineral reserves.
57. U.N. Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond
the Limits of Nat'l Jurisdiction, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/63 (1971), reprinted in DocumENTs 210.
58. U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/63 (1971), reprinted in DocuMENTs 210.
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states as Ceylon, Madagascar, and Somalia under any of the competing
standards of international law and the 1958 Convention."' This ironic

result occurs because a large portion of China's coast is paralleled by
island-states which jointly claim the intervening continental shelf.
Like Japan, China has an ever-increasing need to develop new
petroleum supplies as its industry expands; hence the seabeds adjacent
to its coast are viewed as a primary source of needed fuels.60 Until
recently China had been silent with respect to specific claims to the
resources of the continental shelf. However, in order to bolster its
newly announced claim to the resources of the East China Sea, China
endorsed the claims of the Latin American states to a 200-mile territorial sea and to exclusive sovereignty over the resources of the ocean
floor under the territorial sea as well. 1 In this regard, a Chinese representative recently stated before the United Nations Seabed Committee

that, according to China's interpretation of international law, no recognized limit has traditionally been imposed by international law with

respect to a state's territorial waters. Instead, according to the Chinese
view, each country has been free to exercise its own sovereignty by
unilaterally declaring the extent of its territorial waters and exclusive

national control.62 The Chinese representative also asserted that each
state enjoys the exclusive right to dispose of the natural resources of its

coastal seas and the seabeds beneath its territorial sea.

3

Despite this deference to national claims, China has indicated that

beyond the limits of the territorial sea and seabed over which a nationstate exercises exclusive sovereignty, namely up to 200 miles under the
59. See ANDRAssY 105-06.
60. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1972, § 3, at 5, col. 4. In the development of its natural resources, China subscribes to a policy of "maintaining independence and keeping
the initiative in our own hands and relying on our own efforts." The People's Republic has undertaken a vast program of developing its natural resources, especially in the
area of petroleum. Therefore, it is not surprising that China is greatly concerned about
the Senkaku Islands and the reserves of oil located in the continental shelf. See
PEKING REv., Jan. 21, 1972, at 3.
61. See PEKING REv., Mar. 10, 1972, at 16. This policy statement was made by An
Chih-yuan, Representative of the People's Republic of China, on Mar. 3, 1972, at a meeting of the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor
Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction. Id.
See also U.N. Doe. A/AC. 138/SR.72, at 17 (1972); PEKING REv., Dec. 22, 1972,
at 13-14 (comments of Chen Chu at the U.N. on December 4, 1972); id., Aug. 25,
1972, at 10-14 (summary of policy positions of the People's Republic); id., Aug. 18,
1972, at 13-15 (comments of Shen Wei-liang at the U.N. on July 24, 1972); id., Aug. 11,
1972, at 14-15 (comments of Chen Chih-fang at the U.N. on July 21, 1972); id.,
Mar. 31, 1972, at 17-18 (comments of Shen Wei-lang at the U.N. on March 24, 1972).
62. See PEKING Rnv., Mar. 10, 1972, at 16.
63. Id.
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present Chinese view, the natural resources of the seabed are the common heritage of mankind. As a result of this common interest, the
Chinese consider that questions concerning use and exploitation of such
resources should be settled by all nations.6" Therefore, it appears that
China has by no means refused to consider the allocation of a certain
portion of marine resources to the control of an international organ.
To that extent it would appear that the views of Japan and China are
at least potentially in harmony, despite China's adherence to the more
expansive 200-mile limit of exclusive national control over the territorial sea and continental shelf.
Taiwan: Modified Approval of the Geneva Conventions
Unlike China and Japan, Taiwan is a signatory to the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, though the Nationalist Chinese failed
to ratify the accord until August 21, 1970. 61 After the long delay,
ratification was designed to bolster Taiwan's position in the dispute
with China and Japan over control of the Senkaku Islands-the focal
point of conflicting claims to the economic resources of the East
China Sea.66 In Taiwan's instrument of ratification, article 6 of the
Convention was modified to include exposed rocks and islets as a "natural prolongation" of its land territories. 67 Taiwan presently asserts that
under the third equitable principle enunciated in the North Seas Cases,
such exposed rocks and islets are part of the continental shelf itself.65
This modification of the Geneva Convention was based on the International Court's emphasis on the respect which must be paid to any
natural prolongation of a state's territory in the delimitation of that
state's continental shelf. Under this approach, no state may lawfully
encroach upon areas constituting a natural prolongation of the territory
of another state.69
64. Id. It should be noted that China has been highly reserved in its references
to an international regime:
We maintain that the sea-bed and ocean floor beyond the limits of territorial seas and national jurisdiction should only be used for peaceful purposes in the interest of safeguarding international peace and security. They
should not be used to serve the policy of military aggression of any country. Id.
Of course, since China subscribes to the 200-mile territorial sea principle, which is opposed by all major maritime nations, there is little hope that any viable, international
regime can be established if China refuses to accept a more limited area for the exclusive control of the coastal state. See also id., Aug. 25, 1972, at 11.
65. See Okuhara 103-04.
66. See notes 79, 86-119 infra and accompanying text.
67. See Okuhara 103-04.
68. Id. at 104.
69. The Japanese challenge the position of Taiwan on the following points:
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South Korea: NegotiatedLimits on 200-Mile Claims
In 1952, South Korea issued the Korean Continental Shelf Proclamation claiming complete control over the shelf area adjacent to its

mainland, which extended as much as 200 miles out to sea.

How-

ever, the sea and shelf area encompassed by South Korea's claim measured less than 200 miles where the coasts of South Korea and Japan
were adjacent and their respective claims overlapped; at these places
an arbitrary line was established as the boundary.1 0
The proclamation, establishing the so-called "Rhee Line," indicated that South Korea intended to exercise national sovereignty over
these areas "to reserve, protect, conserve and utilize the resources and
natural wealth of all kinds that may be found on, in, or under the...
seas . . . ."71 Like other small states, South Korea viewed demands
Taiwan quotes the decisions of the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases in an
attempt to claim that the principle of natural prolongation of the land is
established in international law. The Cases, however, were quite different
from the situation of the Senkaku Is.: the former was the dispute between the
states whose coasts are adjacent each other, while the latter is between those
whose coasts are opposite each other. Furthermore, in the above cases,
particular geological features led the Court to conclude that the principle of
equidistance is inequitable and thus to adopt the principle of natural prolongation of the land as its alternative. Even if the pirnciple [sic] has some importance, to apply it to the latter too strictly would mean imposition of unjustifiable disadvantage on the island countries, for this is the case of continental shelf delimitation between a continent country and islands, as well as
between the islands.
Another allegation of Taiwan that exposed rocks and islets are part of the
continental shelf itself can also be refuted as going beyond the provisions of Article 1 of the Continental Shelf Convention, spelling out the definition of the
shelf. The "continental shelf" under the Article extends as far as the area
which is 200 meters deep or where its depth permits exploitation, but in any
case it is the sea bed or the subsoil with superjacent water and at no point includes exposed rocks and islets as is asserted by Taiwan. Thus it is clearly illogical to say that an island which allegedly belongs to a continental shelf does
not have its own continental shelf around it. Id. at 104-05.
70. See ODA 26-27; WEISSBERG 8, 29.
71. U.N. Docs. ST/LEG/SER.B/6 (1957), ST/LEG/SER.B/8 (1959), reprinted in
WEISSBERG 98. See Oda, The Normalization of Relations Between Japan and the Republic of Korea, 61 AM. J.INT'L L. 35, 51-52 (1967). The Korean Presidential Proclamation of Sovereignty over the Adjacent Seas of January 18, 1952, provides:
Supported by well-established international precedents and urged by the
impelling need of safeguarding, once and for all, the interests of national
welfare and defence, the President of the Republic of Korea hereby proclaims:
1. The Government of the Republic of Korea holds and exercises the national sovereignty over the shelf adjacent to the peninsular and insular coasts
of the national territory, no matter how deep it may be, protecting, preserving and utilizing, therefore, to the best advantage of national interests, all the
natural resources, mineral and marine, that exist over the said shelf, on it and
beneath it, known, or which may be discovered in the future.
2. The Government of the Republic of Korea holds and exercises the national sovereignty over the seas adjacent to the coasts of the peninsula and islands of the national territory, no matter what their depths may be, throughout the extension, as here below delineated, deemed necessary to reserve, protect, conserve and utilize the resources and natural wealth of all kinds that
may be found on, in, or under the said seas, placing under the Gov-
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by economic superpowers for freedom of exploiting the high seas as

a form of colonialism. 72

An additional reason for South Korea's

general acceptance of the 200-mile limit of exclusive sovereignty over
the shelf and seas was its desire to preserve both the mineral and fish-

ing resources of the adjoining waters for its own people, especially since
Japan presented major competition with the re-emergence of its massive fishing fleet. 73 Japan, in turn, steadfastly refused to accede to
the extensive claims embodied in the Rhee Line and argued that South
Korean claims were contrary to both the 1958 Geneva Conventions and

customary international law-an argument made nothwithstanding the
fact that Japan itself was not a signatory to the Geneva accord.74
The dispute between the two countries was at least temporarily
settled by the Treaty on Basic Relations, which was signed in June,

1965.75 While South Korea continued to insist after entering into the
pact that the Rhee Line remained in effect, most restrictions on other
nations' activities were removed; and South Korea's area of exclusive

control was greatly reduced. 76 Each country now recognizes that the
ernment supervisions particularly the fishing and marine hunting industries
in order to prevent this exhaustible type of resources and natural wealth from
being exploited to the disadvantage of the inhabitants of Korea, or decreased
or destroyed to the detriment of the country.
4. This declaration of sovereignty over the adjacent seas does not interfere with the rights of free navigation on the high seas. U.N. Docs. ST/LEG/
SER.B/6 (1957), ST/LEG/SER.B/8 (1959), reprintedin WEIssaRo 98-99.
72. See WEISSBERG 8. Soon after the issuance of the Korean Proclamation, the
Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a formal protest. Japan charged that the
Rhee Line violated the "principles of the freedom of the high seas." The Korean Foreign Ministry countered by arguing that the Proclamation was supported by such precedents as the Truman Proclamation and the similar statements which had already been
issued by Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica. South Korea contended that
the International Law Commission and other international bodies recognized the "special status of adjacent seas" and that those who still claimed "absolute" rights of fishing
in seas adjacent to others states' boundaries but outside their three-mile territorial sea
were unaware of the evolution of international law. Id. See notes 11, 13 supra and
accompanying text.
73. See Oda, supra note 71, at 51.
74. See WEISSBERo 67-78. See also id. 9-14, 86-97.
Japan's reliance on the 1958 Convention to buttress its claim would seem to be an
acknowledgement that the Convention at least represents customary international law.
However, Japan's official position before the U.N. Subcommittee on the Law of the Sea
belies this assumption.
75. See WEISSBERO at 86.

76. See Oda, supra note 71, at 53. Professor Oda asserts:
The question of whether the Rhee Line still exists, notwithstanding the provisions of the Agreement on Fisheries, is answered in the negative by the Government of Japan. The Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs
have repeatedly stated that there could be no room for the continued existence
of the Rhee Line and that the Line has been completely abolished. In answer
to the question why the Agreement on Fisheries did not contain any explicit
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other has a right to establish a twelve-mile exclusive fishing zone, except around Cheju Island where South Korea's claim extends beyond

the twelve-mile limit. 77 However, South Korea recently granted oilexploration licenses to exploit the continental shelf to several interna-

tional oil companies in areas claimed by Japan. 78 Therefore, it would
appear that the 1965 Basic Treaty was not as definitive a settlement of
disputed claims as had been hoped by the Japanese.

Although prior to the Basic Agreement South Korea's position on
the extent of the territorial sea and the seabed's resources over which a

nation-state may exercise control closely paralleled that of China, resolution of their overlapping claims to the East China Sea is nonetheless
difficult due to China's active support of North Korea and the absence
of diplomatic relations between Peking and Seoul. With respect to
Japan, however, the current misunderstanding between South Korea
and Japan over oil rights to certain areas of their intervening continental shelf should not be insurmountable since the two countries have

an established pattern of peacefully resolving disputes.
It is readily apparent that each of the four concerned states bordering the East China Sea has adopted definitions of the continental

shelf and territorial sea which best serve its particular economic and
political interests. In the absence of a generally accepted rule of interna-

tional law on the delimitation and control of a state's continental shelf, it
appears that if a peaceful settlement of the dispute is to be achieved, re-

sort must be made to negotiation, arbitration, conciliation, or some type
of international regime.
The unsettled nature of international law pertaining to the con-

tinental shelf at least marginally affects the separate dispute over the
provision concerning the abolition of the Rhee Line, the Director General of the
Cabinet Legislative Bureau explained that since the Rhee Line, which was in
itself illegal under international law, had never been recognized by Japan,
there would be no reason explicitly to abolish it. He stated that any provision
in the municipal law of the [Republic of Korea] which was in conflict with
the Agreement on Fisheries should be considered to have become invalid. The
Minister for Foreign Affairs has declared that, even if the ROK did not amend
its legislation, fishing by Japanese trawlers on the high seas should not be
hindered by illegal interference from Korean authorities, since this international fisheries agreement superseded relevant Korean legislation. The Korean
view, on the other hand, was that the Rhee Line, now called the "peace line,"
would continue to exist for purposes of national security and the preservation
of continental shelf resources. While maintaining a position of non-recognition of the Rhee Line, the Government of Japan nevertheless abandoned all
claims for illegal seizures of -Japanese trawlers- within the Rhee Line which
had occurred over a period of more than ten years. The Government of Japan is now preparing to award certain compensation payments to fishermen
who suffered from the seizure of trawlers. Id. at 53-54.
77. Id. at 52-53.
78. See note 5 supra.
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ownership of the oil-rich Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. Taiwan claims that the Senkakus are a natural prolongation of the Island
of Taiwan and are therefore covered by the 1958 Geneva Convention
as ratified by Taiwan. However, the question of legal title to these islands under international law is distinct from the question of overlapping claims to the continental shelf. Yet, examination of this dispute
further demonstrates the weakness of international law in the pacific
settlement of disputes when strong economic and political interests are
involved.
THE DISPUTE OVER LEGAL TITLE TO THE
SENKAKU ISLANDS

The competing claims of states bordering the East China Sea in
regard to the natural resources of the area have, with the exception of
those of South Korea, become most intense with respect to claims of
ownership of the Senkaku Islands 79 ("Tiao-yu Tai" in Chinese), the
continental shelf of which appears to be particularly rich in petroleum
reserves.

Although claims to the continental shelf of the East China

Sea are overlapping, the competing national claims to the shelf surrounding the Senkakus involve a distinct legal issue-the question of
ownership of a particular territory. Establishing the legitimacy of a
state's title to a coastal territory entails, of course, the right to exploit
the continental shelf of that territory. Hence, interest by the three
states in gaining and legitimizing access to the resources of the shelf
area surrounding the Senkakus necessitates the establishment of title
to the islands themselves.
Two traditional methods by which nation-states may acquire or
claim new territory under international law are occupation and prescription. The principles of law with regard to occupation are fairly
well settled. Under this method of establishing a claim of right, more
than an historical claim to sovereignty is required. The claimant must
demonstrate not only an intent or will to act as sovereign but also some
exercise or display of authority-that is, a claim of title must be buttressed by action in order to be effective. A mere claim of discovery
is not sufficient. The absence of competing claims, administrative acts
with reference to the territory, and active efforts to develop the claimed
79. The Senkaku Islands are also called Senkaku Retto or the Pinnacle Islands.
They consist of five islands (Kuba, Taisho, Uotsuri, Minami Kojima, and Kita Kojima Islands) and the three rock islands (Okono Minamiiwa, Okino Kitaiwa, and Tobise)
which are scattered between 1200 20' and 123' 45' east longitude and 250 40' and
26* north latitude.
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territory would be significant factors in determining ownership by occupation. It should be noted, however, that effective physical occupa-

tion is not always a mandatory prerequisite, depending upon the nature of the terrain, as with barren or uninhabitable areas., °

As to

prescription as a means of establishing title, it is generally accepted
that long, overt possession for a prescribed period of at least fifty years
may serve either to confirm a title the precise origin of which cannot be

demonstrated or to extinguish the prior title of another nation-state.
In this regard, the continuous, peaceful, and uncontested display of
sovereignty is generally acknowledged as establishing good title. The
uncontested nature of a claim is important under a theory of ownership

by prescription since absence of any active challenge to the claimant's
assertion of sovereignty adds support to its claim of title."'
Title to the eight oil-rich islets and exposed rocks which constitute
the Senkakus is claimed, under competing theories, by China, Taiwan,
and Japan. Taiwan's claim to the islands is based on an historical
theory of having title by virtue of use and occupation for a long period

of time and/or the fact that the islands constitute a natural prolongation of the main island of Taiwan itself.8 2

China asserts sovereignty

over the islands as part of Taiwan, which China claims is an "inalienable" part of the mainland.83

In turn, the Japanese argument supporting

Tokyo's claim to legal title is based on its interpretation of the 1952
Peace Treaty with the United States and the Okinawa Reversion Treaty,

the latter purporting to return the islands to Japan. 84
80. See BRiERLY 163-67. See also G. HACKWORTH, I DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 401-09 (1940); WHrrEMAN 1030-62.
81. See BRIUELY 167-71. See also G. HAcKwoRTH, supra note 80, at 432-42;
WHiTEMAN 1062-84.

82. See notes 96-109 infra and accompanying text.
83. See notes 110-14 infra and accompanying text.
84. See notes 116-17 infra and accompanying text. See also Reversion to Japan of
the Ryukyu and Daito Islands, June 17, 1971, T.I.A.S. No. 7314.
The Agreement between the United States and Japan reads:
Considering that the United States of America desires, with respect to the
Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands, to relinquish in favor of Japan all rights
and interest under Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at the city
of San Francisco on September 8, 1951, and thereby to have relinquished all its
rights and interests in all territories under the said Article ....
[Article 1] . . .2. For the purpose of this Agreement, the term "the
Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands" means all the territories and their territorial waters with respect to which the right to exercise all and any powers of
administration, legislation and jurisdiction was accorded to the United States of
America under Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan other than those
with respect to which such right has already been returned to Japan in accordance with the Agreement concerning the Amami Islands and the Agreement
concerning Nanpo Shoto and Other Islands signed between the United States
of America and Japan, respectively on December 24, 1953 and April 5, 1968.
Id. at 3-5.
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Traditionally, territorial title disputes between countries have been
among the most difficult and sensitive issues to settle, 85 even where the
land involved had less economic value than the Senkakus.

Moreover,

when states involved in the conflict have not established diplomatic relations with each other and consequently each refuses to negotiate with
the unrecognized state either directly or indirectly, attempts to apply

maxims of international law are even more futile.
HistoricalBackground
References to the Senkaku Islands appeared in Chinese voyage
and navigation records as "Tiao-yu Tai" in 1403.88 As to Japanese

records, the islands were not registered in the official land book until
1895.87 However, the Senkakus were officially obtained by Japan as
a result of the Sino-Japanese War in an annexation which was legalized

by the Treaty of Shimonoseki in May, 1895.18

Thereafter, Japan re-

mained in exclusive supervisory possession of the islands until the

United States took administrative control at the end of World War II."0
Certain international accords are relevant to the Japanese and

Chinese claims.

The 1943 Cairo Declaration determined that Japan

should be stripped of all territories in the Pacific region seized after
1914 and that all territory stolen from China would be restored. 0 ArJapan and South Korea are also in conflict over a potentially oil-rich island in the
Japan Sea called "Takeshima" in Japanese, or "Dokdo" in Korean. Both claims also
have an historical basis. See note 120 infra.
85. See generally BRIMLY 162-211.
86. See Hearings 146. Taiwan's position with respect to the basis of her historical
claims was presented in great detail before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by
several interested professors and lobbying groups: Shien-Biau Woo, University of Delaware; Thomas C. Dunn, Wilmington, Delaware; John Fincher, Johns Hopkins University; and the Coordinators for the Tiao-yu Tai Open Letters (a pressure group of
concerned American-Chinese and China-scholars). See id. at 92, 110, 115, 144-54.
87. Okuhara 97-98.
88. Hearings 146-47.
89. See Okuhara 99-100.
90. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNrrED STATES: THE
CONFERENCES AT CAIRO AND TEHRAN 1943, at 448 (1961).
It is important to remember that the islands in question were ceded to Japan by
China in 1895 by the Treaty of Shimonoseki, before the 1914 date mentioned in the Declarations.
The pertinent part of the Cairo Declaration provides that
Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized
or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the
territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and
the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also
be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed.
Id.
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title 8 of the 1945 Potsdam Declaration mandated that the Cairo
Declaration be implemented and that Japan be limited to ownership of
the four main islands of Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku, and Kyushu as
well as "such minor islands as [the Allied Powers] determine." 91 Formosa (Taiwan) and the Pescadores were specifically mentioned, but no
reference was made to the Senkakus. s Under the 1952 San Francisco
Peace Treaty with the United States, however, the area assigned to the
United States for administration expressly included the Senkaku Is-

lands."3 In 1951 Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had asserted that
Japan retained residual sovereignty over the Senkakus; 94 and subsequent to Mr. Dulles' statement, the United States consistently main-

tained this position until the present dispute with respect to ownership
arose.

95

Taiwan's Claims
Neither Taiwan nor China demanded the "return" of these islands
91. SENATE SUIBCOMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, A DECADE OF AMERIcAN FOREIGN

POLICY: BASIC DOCUMENTS, 1941-49, S. Doc. No. 123, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 49
(1950).
92. Id. at 22.
93. See Okuhara 100. The islands were placed under American administrative control by article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. This article did not specifically
include the islands, but Proclamation No. 27 and the Ryukyu Government Charter, as
amended by the U.S. Civil Administration, expressly mentioned the islands as being in
the area controlled by the U.S. Furthermore, the U.S. exercised actual administrative
control over the Senkaku Islands. The Ryukyu government has also shared in the
control of these islands. Landmarks were erected on the islands in 1968 by the Ryukyu government (after the Emery Report revealed the presence of valuable oil deposits).
Some Chinese from Taiwan raised the flag of the Republic of China on Uotsuri Island, one of the Senkakus, in September, 1970. The U.S. State Department responded:
The term ['Nansei Shoto'], as used in that [Peace] Treaty, refers to all islands
south of 29th degrees north latitude under Japanese administration at the
end of the Second World War [and] not otherwise specifically referred to in
the Treaty. The term, as used in the Treaty, was intended to include the
Senkaku Islands. U.S. Dep't of State Release (Sept. 10, 1970), reprinted in
Okuhara 100 n.15.
94. See Hearings 4-5. Secretary of State William Rogers has indicated that the "residual sovereignty" concept referred to by Mr. Dulles was intended as a declaration of
United States policy that the U.S. administration was to be temporary and that all territory which had previously belonged to Japan would be returned intact. Id. See generally N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1972, at 17, col. 1.
95. In order to avoid any conflict with China after the invitation to President Nixon
to visit, the United States announced in opportune fashion that its official position is simply that the parties involved should settle the dispute and that the United States will
remain neutral. Prior to this time, the U.S. had given full support to Japan's claim of
residual sovereignty over the islands. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1971, at 36, col. 2.
Secretary of State Rogers, reiterating this new U.S. position before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee in 1971, stated that "we have made it clear that this treaty
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from Japan until recently.9 Indeed, no demands were tendered by
Taiwan when the bilateral Sino-Japan Peace Treaty was signed in

1952. 97 Moreover, as late as 1968 Taiwan had never included the
islands in any official listing of its territory."' Taiwan's official denunciation of Japan's claim of sovereignty over the disputed islands
was not made until August 16, 1970, when a resolution claiming title
was submitted to the Jincha Yuan (House of Inspection). 0 China,
in turn, publicly claimed the Senkakus for the first time on December

4, 1970, through the official press. 100
The claims of the Government of Taiwan, and consequently the

claims of China, are based on various arguments with respect to geography, history, and interpretation of international agreements. Geographically, the islands are only 120 miles from Taipei; 10 1 but it should

be noted that the islands are also only 100 miles from the southerndoes not affect the legal status of those islands at all. Whatever the legal situation was
prior to the treaty is going to be the legal situation after the treaty comes into effect."
Hearings11.
96. See Okuhara 97.
97. It is presently Taiwan's position that the Senkaku Islands were restored to
Chinese (Republic of China) sovereignty, along with Taiwan and the Pescadores, by the
1952 Peace Treaty. The islands were originally taken by Japan as a part of Taiwan and
were not specifically mentioned in the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Therefore, when Taiwan
was returned after World War II, it is argued that the islands which were taken with
Taiwan in 1895 were likewise returned. And, as a result, it is further argued that it was
not incumbent upon Taiwan to mention the Senkakus specifically when the 1952 SinoJapanese Peace Treaty was negotiated. Taiwan also contends that the U.S. administration
of the islands was invalid and of no legal effect since the Senkakus did not belong
to Japan (and that therefore the U.S. had no right to be administering them). Naturally,
it follows from this interpretation that the islands could not be returned to Japan by
the Okinawa Reversion Treaty. See generally Hearings151-52.
98. See Okuhara 102.
99. See id. at 97.
100. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1970, at 32, col. 3. In June, 1971, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China issued a statement claiming title to the Tiao.yu
Tai Islands:
Having learned that the United States Government and the Japanese
Government are going to sign in the immediate future formal instruments for
the transfer of the Ryukyu Islands, and together therewith, the Tiao-Yu Tai
Islets, over which the Republic of China exercises its territorial sovereignty,
the Chinese government considers it necessary to emphasize once again its
position, and make its views known to the world...
These islets belong to the Chinese Province of Taiwan and thus constitute part of the territory of the Republic of China. They are closely linked
to the latter by reason of geographical location, geological structure, historical associations, and, above all, by reason of the long and continued use
which the inhabitants of Taiwan have made of these islets. Bound by the
sacred duty to defend its national territory, the Chinese government will
never relinquish any particle of its territorialsovereignty under any circumstances. Hearings 148.
101. See Hearings 110 (statement of Mr. Thomas Dunn).
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most island of the Ryukyu Chain, title to which is vested in Japan. 102
In addition to their physical proximity to Taiwan, the Senkakus are
part of the continental shelf surrounding Taiwan, inasmuch as the
channel between Taiwan and the islands is never deeper than 200 meters, while the water plunges to a depth of over 1000 meters between
the Senkakus and the Japanese-controlled Ryukyu. Islands. 10 3 This
fact seemingly establishes a closer physical bond between the Senkakus
and Taiwan than between the Senkakus and the Ryukyu Islands. In
this regard, Taiwan now claims the Senkakus as a natural prolongation
of its mainland because of Taiwan's ratification of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, with the specific reservation incorporating the North Seas Cases doctrine.' 04
Taiwan's historical argument is premised on China's allegedly exclusive use of the Senkakus as a storm shelter from 1403 until 1884,
when the Japanese claim to have discovered the Senkakus. 0 5 Moreover, Taiwan insists that before World War II Japan considered the islands a part of the Taiwan Prefecture 0 6 and not a part of the Ryukyu
102. See Okuhara 105.
103. Hearings 150.
104. See notes 65-69 supra and accompanying text.
105. The relevant historical dates in this controversy are as follows:
1403-The first documented Chinese recording of the Tiao-yu Tai Islands ....
1534-All the major islands in that group had been properly identified and
named by China ....
1783-The first Japanese mention of Tiao-yu Tai ....
1879-Japan incorporated the Ryukyu Islands . . . into its Empire ....

1884-The "discovery" of the Tiao-yu Tai Islands by a Japanese, named...
KOGA.
1885-The Japanese government rejected application from Mr. KOGA for
permission for acquisition of the right of lease, on the grounds that "It is not
clear whether the Senkaku Islands belong to Japan or China ......
1894-Sino-Japanese war of 1894, beginning in August and ending in March,
1895, with the defeat of China ....
1895-The Japanese Cabinet annexed Tiao-Yu Tai into her territory in January.
... The Treaty of Shimonoseki was concluded between China and Japan
in May, whereupon China ceded Taiwan, all islands appertaining or belonging
to Taiwan, and the Pescadores Islands to Japan ....
Dec. 1943-Cairo Declaration stated that:

".

.

. all the territories Japan

has stolen from the Chinese . . .shall be returned to the Republic of China
The terms of the
July 1945-Potsdam Declaration, article 8 stated that: "...
Cairo Declaration shall be carried out ......
Sept. 1945-The formal Instrument of Surrender was signed at Tokyo Bay. It
reads: "We . . .hereby accept the provisions set forth in the declaration issued ... at Potsdam ..

"

1951-The Treaty of Peace with Japan, signed by Japan and the Allied Powers
(except . . .China) ....

Article 2.(b) reads: "Japan renounces all right,

title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores ......
1952-Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty was concluded. Article 4 reads: "It is recognized that all treaties, conventions and agreements concluded before December 9, 1941, between China and Japan have become null and void as a consequence of that war." Hearings151-52.
106. A prefecture in the Japanese system of political subdivisions corresponds to
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Islands, so that title to both Taiwan and the accompanying islands was
renounced by Japan in 1952 through the Sino-Japanese accord.107
Furthermore, the Cairo Declaration of 1943 stated that all territories

stolen from China after 1914 would be returned by Japan, and Taiwan
now claims that the specific reference to Formosa (Taiwan) in the

1952 Peace Treaty impliedly included the Senkaku Islands. 08 Taiwan

further contends that the United States' administrative control, intended

only as 9a temporary expedient, is without contemporary legal signifi10
cance.
China'sClaims

Basing its claim to the Senkakus upon its assertion of sovereignty
over Taiwan itself, China verbally challenged Japan's claim of sov-

ereignty over the islands after oil was discovered in 1968 and after the
United States announced that the islands would be returned to Japan

as part of the Okinawa Reversion.110 In its official newspaper, China
claimed that it had always maintained that Okinawa should be returned
to the Japanese people, but at the same time proclaimed that it would
never permit the U.S. and the Japanese reactionaries to annex Chinas
sacred territory Tiaoyu Tai and other islands by making use of the Okinawa Reversion swindle. . . and make it a fait accompli. The Chinese
Government and people will absolutely not tolerate these crimes of encroachment upon China's sovereignty.'11
a state in the United States. Each political unit has a defined territory and a government which handles local matters.
107. See note 97 supra.
108. See Hearings 152. See note 97 supra. While both the Nationalist Chinese and
the Communist Chinese were in substantial agreement at the time of the Cairo Declaration, the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations are generally discounted as to their binding
legal authority. When the Declarations were promulgated, the Allies were not yet victorious over Japan, so the statements contained therein were largely made for political
effect. Also, since Japan was not a party to these agreements, it is at best dubious
to assert that she is bound by them without her concurrence. Regardless of the validity
of these agreements, no specific reference was made to the Senkaku Islands.
109. See Hearings 111.
*110. See Okuhara 97.
111. Hearings93 (Chinese newspaper editorial).
The People's Republic has utilized the same historical approach to buttress its argument as Taiwan; indeed, the chronology of events is almost identical to the Taiwan
version. In addition, China argues that in the Treaty of Shimonoseki, "Taiwan, together
with all islands appertaining to Taiwan" were ceded to Japan. Therefore, when Taiwan was returned to China via the 1952 Peace Treaty, the islands should have been included just as they were when Japan gained control over Taiwan, See PEKiNO REV.,
Jan. 7, 1972, at 13. China further contends that American assumption of administrative control was a unilateral act never recognized by China. Also, it is argued that it
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Since 1970 China has periodically continued to lay claim to the
Senkaku Islands as well as to the resources of the continental shelf sur-

rounding them. 1 ' In addition, official protests against Japan's claim
to the islands were included in a letter by Huang Hua of the Chinese
United Nations delegation to Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim in May,
1972,11 and were registered in several speeches before the U.N. subcommittees preparing for the 1973 Conference on the Law of the
4
Sea."1
Japan'sClaims
In defending its claim to the Senkakus, Japan relies upon the fact

of its uncontested use of the islands after they were ceded to Japan as a
result of the 1895 Peace Treaty with China, a contention which ba-

sically invokes the theory of prescriptive ownership."

5

In this regard,

Japan utilized the islands under various arrangements, including a longterm lease to a Japanese citizen for possible settlement and develop-

ment." 6

The primary thrust of Japan's claim to title, however, is

based upon the effects of American administration of the islands and
the subsequent inclusion of the Senkakus in the Reversion Treaty.
Thus, Japan's Foreign Minister Aichi claimed that the Reversion
Treaty settled the question of ownership as far as Japan and the United

States are concerned." 7

This position is based on an interpretation

"is all the more impermissible for the Japanese and U.S. Governments to make an illicit
transfer of China's Tiao-yu and other islands between themselves while perpetrating
the Okinawa 'reversion' fraud." Id., Apr. 7, 1972, at 18.
112. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1970, at 5, col. 1. See also PEKING REV., May 12,
1972, at 18; id., Apr. 7, 1972, at 18; id., Jan. 7, 1972, at 13.
113. The Huang Hua letter protested the inclusion of the Tiao-yu Tai Islands with
the property being returned to Japan by the United States in the Okinawa Reversion
Treaty:
It should be pointed out in particular that in their agreement concerning the
Ryukyu Islands . ., the U.S. and Japanese Governments openly included
China's territory the Tiaoyu and other islands in the "reversion zone," which
is a serious violation of the territory and sovereignty of the People's Republic
of China . . . . It is entirely illegal and null and void for the U.S. and
Japanese Governments to make an illicit transfer between themselves of China's
territory. The Chinese Government and people will never accept it. PEKING
REv., May 26, 1972, at 15.
114. See, e.g., id., Mar. 17, 1972, at 10; id., Mar. 10, 1972, at 14.
115. See text accompanying note 81 supra and note 118 infra.
116. See Okuhara 99.
117. Wash. Post, June 19, 1971, at A9, col. 5 reports: "Japanese Foreign Minister
Kiiehi Aichi rejected the Taiwan government's latest claim to the disputed Senkaku Islands yesterday . . . . Aichi said the Okinawa Agreement had settled the matter [of
Tiao-yu Tail completely as far as the United States and Japan were concerned."
The Japanese Government has not officially published its position with respect to
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of the Cairo Declaration, Potsdam Declaration, and the 1952 Peace
Treaty to the effect that these agreements do not deprive Japan of its

residual sovereignty over these islands. For example, the Cairo Declaration expressly referred to all territory seized from China after 1914;
Japan, however, obtained title to the islands in 1895.18 Finally, Ja-

pan presently purports to exercise sovereign control over the Senkakus
and has deployed military units to patrol the area.
Regardless of the validity of these arguments with respect to ownership of the Senkakus, Japanese legal commentators have asserted that

Japan's position is soundly based on international law; accordingly,
they have suggested settling the title dispute by referral to the International Court of Justice or by arbitration in compliance with standards
established by general principles of international law and by the International Court in the North Seas Cases.119 However, to date, the
Government of Japan has not moved to settle the dispute within the

ambit of international law.
the Senkaku Islands. However, several Japanese newspapers have published very similar
statements in support of the government position:
(1) It is claimed that the islands were discovered by Koga, a Japanese citizen, and
were thereafter utilized exclusively by the Japanese.
(2) They point to Imperial Ordinance No. 13 which declared in 1896 (after the
Treaty of Shimonoseki) that the islands belonged to Japan.
(3) United States Command Administrative Ruling Ordinance No. 27 issued by the
U.S. occupation forces in 1953 is cited as including the islands as part of Japan to be administered by the U.S. See Hearings 149.
118. See generally Okuhara 97-103.
Also, a strong argument can be made that Japan has acquired legal title to the islands by prescription, irrespective of the interpretations given the above arguments,
since the United States officially maintained that Japan retained residual sovereignty over
the Senkakus while they were administered by the United States. Prescriptive title to
lands is acquired when a state has exercised its exclusive authority over a territory in a
continuous, uninterrupted, and peaceful manner for a "sufficient period of time." WHiTEmAN 1062-82. In the British Guiana Boundary Arbitration between Great Britain and
Venezuela, it was decided that adverse holding or prescription for a period of fifty years
constituted a "sufficient period of time" and gave good title where the land was under the
exclusive political control of the aggressor. BmiERLY 169-70. Such title is only good
if the affected states have acquiesced to this exercise of dominion. Protest must be made
within a reasonable time and a mere statement of protest through notes or the press
is insufficient: referral to an appropriate international organization or proof that every
effort has been made to induce a peaceful settlement is required. See WMTEMAN 106282. Japan has exercised either exclusive sovereignty over the islands or has retained
residual sovereignty over them for over seventy-five years, and neither Taiwan nor China
ever made any effort to regain control until after 1968.
119. See Okuhara 105. Whereas Japan offered to submit the Takeshima Island dispute with South Korea to the International Court of Justice, see note 120 infra, it
has shown no signs of following this pattern in the controversy over the Senkakus.
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DISPOSITION OF CONFLICTING NATIONAL CLAIMS:

THE

ALTERNATIVES FOR SETTLEMENT

Clearly, the conflicting claims over the East China Sea continental
shelf and the ownership of the Senkaku Islands must be satisfactorily
settled before the vast economic potential of this area can be effectively
developed. Although the natural resources are vitally important to
the contenders, the uncertain condition of the controlling body of international law and the delicacy of the political questions at issue seem
to militate against prompt agreement. 12 0 While Japan, Taiwan, and
South Korea have demonstrated a willingness to negotiate and cooperate with each other in the development of the continental shelf's re120. See notes 8-46 supra and accompanying text.
The conflict over the ownership of the Senkaku Islands is not the only title dispute plaguing Japan at the present. South Korea claims sovereignty over a small island
called "Takeshima" in Japanese and "Dokdo" in Korean which is roughly equidistant
from South Korea's Ulneungdo Island and Japan's Okinoshima Island in the Japan Sea.
The area surrounding the island is thought to be oil-rich. The legal questions at issue
are almost identical with those surrounding the Senkaku dispute, and the facts vary
only slightly. The South Korean claim dates from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries,
when the island was used as a base for fishing; and it was left unoccupied until around
1850, when it was taken over by the Japanese as a fishing area which was inhabited
at various times. The rights of exploitation were turned over to private Japanese citizens. The island of Takeshima was officially registered in the land-book of Japan in
1905, the title being disputed at that time by Korea. See Taijudo, The Dispute Between
Japan and Korea Respecting Sovereignty over Takeshima, 12 JAPANESE ANNUAL OF
INT'L L. 2, 4, 7, 9 (1968).
When the U.S. occupation began in Japan, Takeshima
was included in the area to be administered along with the main islands of Japan.
South Korea, like China and Taiwan with respect to the Senkaku Islands, claims
that title to the island was vested in it at the end of World War II due to the Cairo
and Potsdam Declarations, which mandated the return to the rightful owners of all
territories "stolen" by the Japanese in their period of "greed." Id. at 13. The Japanese counter by arguing that they recognized in 1952 the independence of Korea only
as it existed before being annexed to Japan, at which time Takeshima was already a
part of Japan and under its control. The peace agreement specifically mentioned the
other islands which were returned, and Takeshima was not included. Id. at 13-14.
The 1928 Palmas Islands Award by Judge Huber is relied upon by Japan to claim title:
the standard for claims of title to uninhabited islands was to be "'grounded on the
peaceful and continuous display of State authority over the islands."' Id. at 8.
South Korea originally gained control of the islands and established police patrols
when the Rhee Line was established in 1952 after the U.S. returned administrative control of the main islands to the Japanese. Desiring to avoid armed conflict, Japan has
not attempted to oust South Korea. Consequently, the Japanese, with confidence in
their position, have proposed sending the dispute to the International Court of Justice;
but South Korea absolutely refuses to consider this alternative at present. Id. at 14-15.
While the fact situation involved in this dispute closely parallels that surrounding the
Senkaku Islands, the political questions do not seem to be as difficult since South Korea
and Japan do have established diplomatic relations and since there is a tradition of negotiation and peaceful settlement of disputes.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1973:823

sources, China has criticized this liaison as a capitalistic plot.12 '
The probable key to an investigation into viable alternatives for

settlement is China's historical practice with respect to international
law and its recent membership in the United Nations, as well as its
aspirations, conflicting with those of Japan, to establish hegemony in
Asia. 122 Traditionally, China has recognized treaties and customs as
basic sources of international law; 123 moreover, China is presently
known for meticulous observance of treaty obligations., 2 4

However,

121. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1970, at 32, col. 3. See also PEKING REv., Jan. 7, 1972,
at 13.
122. These conflicting aspirations of Japan and China to establish hegemony in regard to the newly emerging bloc of Asian countries will undoubtedly influence the nature of any accord. In this regard, the Chinese and Japanese are so sensitive to
charges of power politics in Asia that they specifically disclaimed any designs on Asian
hegemony in the Joint Communique issued by Prime Minister Tanaka and Premier
Chou En-lai. Their obvious intent was to allay the fears of their smaller Asian neighbors who question the motives of the Asian giants who have been arch-enemies for
generations and who have suddenly embraced each other so warmly. See generally
PEKiNG Rv., Oct. 6, 1972, at 12. The conflicting political aims will, of course, be
counterbalanced to some extent by the economic desirability of cooperation between
Japan and China.
123. SeeCru 2.
In practice, China generally includes the five principles of coexistence in treaties
it negotiates: (1) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty;
(2) mutual nonaggression; (3) mutual noninterference in each other's internal affairs;
(4) equality and mutual benefit; (5) peaceful coexistence. Id. at 3 n.12. Communist
Chinese writers assert that the increasing number of treaties including these principles
indicates that they have become part of the customary international law. However,
it can be argued that these principles are not novel at all and had been generally accepted in international law before China started promoting them as part of its international policy. Id. at 3-4.
124. See LEE 79, 119. Historically, however, China had a record of poor performance in abiding by treaty obligations. This phenomenon has been attributed to
the fact that the treaties not honored were "unequal" treaties which were originally accepted by China under duress. While under the Western approach coercion exercised
against a state in the signing of an agreement does not vitiate the resulting treaty,
the Chinese have condemned numerous treaties concluded under duress and have declared them void. See Cmu 29-30. However, when the Communist Chinese took control in 1949, they did not follow the pattern established by the Bolsheviks of abrogating all treaty obligations incurred by the previous regime. In China it was declared
that "'the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China shall examine
the treaties and agreements concluded between the Kuomintang and foreign governments, and recognize, or abrogate or revise or renew them according to their respective contents.'" LEE 21 (quoting a translation of Article 55 of the Common Program
adopted in 1949 at the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference). As a result, many "unequal treaties" were rejected, but most treaties dealing with boundaries
were maintained. See id.; Cmu 92.
An alternative explanation accounting for China's new responsibility in meeting
its treaty obligations is offered by Professor Lee. He views the Confucian concept of
1ias a major determinative factor in China's present international relations and corn-
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China purports to abide only by its own treaties resulting from direct,
bilateral negotiations, thereby avoiding imposition upon China of

"bourgeois" mandates which have been incorporated into multinational
conventions and general international agreements.' 2 5

As is traditional

in international law, agreements to which China is not a party-such
as the Geneva Conventions of 1958-are not considered binding. 126
In addition, China has never been willing to participate in any interna-

tional conference where Taiwan has been represented and has refused
1 7
to recognize any claims made by Taiwan.
Obviously, no extensive exploitation of this area can realistically
mitments. Li is primarily concerned with sincerity (ch'eng) and trustworthiness
(hsin), the Western equivalents being "good faith" and "pacta sunt servanda." These
concepts are controlling in the Confucian system in relations between friends. As such,
Ii establishes the moral rules of good conduct and good manners between individuals
on all levels of contact. These concepts are not too different from the Western concept of "natural law" which is primarily concerned with how actuality is related to
normative order. When these Confucian concepts are applied to international agreements, it means that the parties deal with each other on the basis of equality, and that
each has an obligation to maintain the agreements on a basis of good faith. Abiding by
one's obligations is a matter of honor. While this sort of rationalization may seem tenuous to the Western mind, it must be remembered that ideology has traditionally been
a more controlling factor in Eastern societies than elsewhere in the world. See LEE 2628, 128-30. See generally Lee, Chinese Communist Law: Its Background and Development, 60 MicH. L. Rnv. 439 (1962).
125. See LEE 79; C-mu 75-78.
126. China adheres to the basic principle of international law of pacta tertis nec
nocent nec prosunt, whereby a treaty does not impose obligations or confer rights on
any third party. See Cmu 48.
127. Id. at 45. The official claims of China to sovereignty over Taiwan were
voiced by Shao Chin-fu:
After the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, the government of the Ch'ing Dynasty, by signing the Treaty of Shimonoseki, ceded Taiwan and Penghu to
Japan. With the outbreak of China's War of Resistance against Japan in 1937,
in accordance with internationallaw, the treaties between the countries became
null and void. The Treaty of Shimonoseki was no exception. In 1945, after
China's victory in the Anti-Japanese War, China recovered these two places
from Japan .

. .

. Since Taiwan has always been Chinese territory, it is a mat-

ter of course for China to take it back like a thing restored to its original owner.
It is not a case of China taking a new territory from Japan which must be
affirmed by a peace treaty. Id. at 118.
Western scholars generally maintain that Taiwan legally became part of Japan with
the 1895 Treaty and that it was "restored" to China with the surrender of Japan in
1945. Therefore, by legal norms China has acquired a new territory which must be
confirmed by a peace treaty or other principles of international law.
However, since the Chinese deem the Treaty of Shomonoseki to be an "unjust
treaty," the agreement was automatically abrogated with the advent of the war and
the territory ceded in 1895 was automatically transferred back to China. See id.
Seemingly, both Western and Chinese legal scholars should be satisfied that the
People's Republic now has "legal" title to Taiwan, especially in light of the Joint
Communique of China and Japan wherein Japan acknowledged that it "understands and
respects" the position of China with respect to Taiwan.
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proceed without regard to China's claims; hence, attention must be
focused on the likelihood of resort by the parties to armed conflict,
negotiated settlement, conciliation, referral to an international body for
arbitration, or creation of an international regime-the classical modes
of settling international disputes.
Resort to Armed Force
The most extreme possibility for disposition of the title dispute
over the Senkaku Islands and for settlement of the overlapping claims
to the continental shelf would be resort to armed conflict. In this regard, it is instructive to note that China risked war with the Soviet
Union over the small, uninhabited island of Chen Pao Tao (Damansk)
in the Ussuri River between China and Russia, even though the economic and strategic value of the island appeared minimal at best. 128
Moreover, China has vigorously protested that Japan's claims in the
East China Sea are part of a capitalistic plot.
Nonetheless, China's recent actions specifically belie the possibility
of resort to force. In particular, China's recent entry into the United
Nations and the spirit of detente which Peking has actively promoted
tend to diminish possibilities for China's use of armed force. In fact,
Peking's stern language with respect to Japanese designs in the East
China Sea has consistently been coupled with references to the countries' new "friendship," a fact which seems to indicate that resort to
force is not anticipated. 1 29 As to Taiwan, use of military force by
China also seems remote with regard to the respective claims to the
continental shelf and the Senkakus.
Negotiation, Conciliationand Arbitration
Three firmly established modes of settlement of international disputes are negotiation, conciliation, and arbitration. However, utiliza128. See Hearings 94. While it does not seem that China will resort to armed con-

flict at this juncture, the potential for conflict is still present due to Japan's newly
adopted practice of patrolling the islands by air and sea patrols to insure that no other
state will be able to seize physical control of the islands and to prevent oil companies
not authorized by the Japanese from exploring for oil. China has consistently stated
that it will not tolerate Japan's exercise of sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands, and any
attempt on Japan's part to begin exploiting the oil reserves without a settlement with
China could potentially lead to armed conflict. To date, China has not specifically
threatened to retaliate with force. See, e.g., PEmnrKRnv., Apr. 7, 1972, at 23; id.,
Jan. 7, 1972, at 13-14.
129. This hypothesis as to China's attitude toward Japan since the establishing of
diplomatic relations in October, 1972, is grounded on the dearth of harsh invective
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tion of such methods is hampered when countries involved in a dispute
refuse to extend diplomatic recognition to each other. As a result,
despite the fact that modes of dispute resolution are available under the
international legal system, the inability of an authoritative legal order
to require utilization of available means exacerbates the difficulty of
achieving a peaceful settlement. Nevertheless, at least with respect to
China, it should be noted that Peking has frequently demonstrated
a pragmatic willingness to settle disputed issues by negotiatingwith quasiofficial groups, referred to as "private parties," from unrecognized
states.13 0 Prior to September, 1972, China did not recognize Japan, yet
China included in its official treaty series various agreements reached by
"private parties" of Japan and China establishing fishing and trade
arrangements, thereby imbuing such accords with the force of law.13 1
For example, the 1958 Geneva Convention with respect to fishing
and conservation provides that nations fishing in the same areas are
obligated to negotiate conservation programs. 132 Since China was
neither a member of the United Nations nor a signatory of the Convention, no binding obligation was imposed upon China to negotiate
such a treaty with Japan. Notwithstanding the absence of a legal
commitment, workable agreements were reached between private associations representing the two countries. 33 In addition, the few disputes which have arisen subsequent to these agreements have been
promptly settled by negotiation or conciliation, although not by arbitration.13 4 Not only has China demonstrated a pragmatic approach in
protecting its own economic interests, 35 but the People's Republic has
which was previously so pronounced in the Chinese press with reference to Japan's economic and political activities in Asia. A survey of the Peking Review before this meeting in Peking demonstrates a surprising change of attitude on the part of the Chinese.
130. See LE 59, 71.
131. Id. It can be assumed that these agreements had prior governmental approval,
if in fact they were not actually formulated by the respective governments. The
Japanese Government does not officially recognize these agreements, but as noted, the
Chinese accord them official standing. Id.
132. Id. 59-60. The official title of the accord is the "Convention on Fishing and
Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas."
133. This agreement was reached between the Japanese-Chinese Friendship Society
and the Chinese Peoples' Foreign Cultural Association. Id. 65. Japan desired to
obtain the return of her many fishing vessels which had been seized in Chinese waters
and to regularize fishing practices in the disputed waters. For its part, China desired
to develop and modernize its fishing industry, so it extracted promises of economic
and technical assistance from the Japanese in return for concessions on areas where
Japanese fishermen could fish. The agreement is generally viewed as being most favorable to Japan. See id. 61-63.
134. See generally id. 66-68, 79.
135. Thus, even though Japan continued to recognize Taiwan until recently, trade
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also been highly dependable in honoring obligations arising out of

"private party" transactions. 136

With respect to boundary disputes,

87

the Chinese have expressly

stated that negotiation with a view to a just settlement is the appropriate method of resolving disputed issues. Thus, Chou En-lai stated in
1957 with reference to the Sino-Burmese border question that the consistent policy of the Chinese government was to resolve all issues with
other countries by peaceful negotiation on the basis of justice and rea-

sonableness.'3 8 The ensuing negotiations with the Burmese government were highly sensitive and protracted, but the final resolution was
deemed fair by both sides.'8

9

Since the establishment of the China-

Burma border, China has consistently respected it.'40

Therefore, in

light of past incidents' 4 ' such as the Burma border dispute, it is clearly
between Japan and China increased steadily over the years. In 1966 Japan's trade
with China increased by thirty-two percent to $621 million, making China Japan's second largest customer after the United States. While there have been fluctuations since
1966 in the level of trade, it is anticipated that there will be a steady increase over
the years largely due to Japan's great need for natural resources which China possesses
and China's need for new technology and heavy industrial equipment which Japan
can readily supply. In each case, it is much cheaper for these Asian nations to trade
than to rely on Western manufacturers whose labor and transportation costs greatly inflate their prices. See id. 69-71.
As a condition of recognizing China, Japan had to break all diplomatic contacts
with Taiwan. However, this diplomatic move has not lessened appreciably the economic
contacts between Taiwan and Japan. Each state has established permanent trade missions in the other state, and trade is progressing at a high level. The complete severance of all economic ties with Taiwan was not made a precondition to establishing diplomatic relations by the People's Republic of China. This fact can be viewed as another example of China's pragmatic approach to states dealing with Taiwan and with
which it would be advantageous for China to establish diplomatic relations. See generally PExiNo R v., Oct. 6, 1972, at 12-13.
136. See LEE 79.
137. In negotiating boundary disputes, China has consistently invoked the doctrine of
rebus sic stantibus, a principle of international law which notes historical changes
giving rise to present claims. See Crmu 107. Such an approach to the settlement of territorial disputes could arguably be employed in Japan's favor since that country has
had at least nominal, unchallenged control over the Senkaku Islands since 1895.
Professor Lee asserts that the theory of rebus sic stantibus is paralleled by the concept of i in Chinese ideology. See note 124 supra and accompanying text.
138. See LEE 31.
139. See id. 34-35.
140. Id. 35.
141. It is generally acknowledged that with the exception of boundary disputes with
India and Russia, China has always settled its boundary quarrels peacefully and has
done so generally in a manner favorable to her neighbors. Id. 31-39. It can generally be asserted that China has settled its boundary disputes through meticulous
negotiation and surveying which resulted in agreements based on historical boundaries, custom, and particular needs of the concerned parties. China has concluded bor-
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possible that China and Japan could negotiate a lasting settlement of
their conflicting claims to the Senkaku Islands and to the continental
shelf.
However, Taiwan presents a major obstacle to any viable solution of the dispute. China bases its claim to the Senkakus and the surrounding continental shelf on its assertion of sovereignty over Taiwan,
a claim which Japan indicates that it "understands and respects.' 4 2
In view of this "understanding," it is possible that Japan and China
could negotiate an agreement to jointly exploit the islands and the
shelf area, leaving the question of title unresolved and thereby presenting Taiwan with a fait accompli.
Also, negotiated settlement of the controversies involving South
Korea-unlike the dispute among China, Japan, and Taiwan-would
not seem to be insurmountable. Japan and South Korea have demonstrated a willingness to negotiate their differences, although the question of sovereignty over another disputed island, Takeshima, was intentionally omitted from the 1965 Basic Treaty; and South Korea has
steadfastly refused to submit the issue to the International Court of
Justice. Moreover, an agreement between China and South Korea
concerning claims to the continental shelf is not a completely unreasonable prospect, given China's previous precedent of dealing with
"private parties" and the fact that China has never insisted upon formal
diplomatic relations as a prerequisite for concluding an agreement.
While China's close relationship and support of North Korea could
militate against such a settlement, China has looked with favor upon
the recent efforts towards rapprochement between North and South
Korea. 143 In either case, the economic desirability of exploiting the
continental shelf immediately and the economic pressure Japan could
bring to bear on South Korea to negotiate a settlement could be the
decisive elements in this arena of disputes and overlapping claims.
As to the possibility of third-party participation in the form of
arbitration or conciliation, two other classical modes of settling interder agreements with Nepal, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Mongolia. Id. 35-36. However, areas of contention still remain between India and Russia on the one side and
China on the other. Id. 36-37. There are also some minor disagreements which
have never been settled with Hong Kong, Macao, and Kowloon. Id. 38 n.26.
142. PEKING Rnv., Oct. 6, 1972, at 12. The joint declaration of Japan and China specifically states:
(3) The Government of the People's Republic of China reaffirms that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China.
The Government of Japan fully understands and respects this stand of the Government of China and adheres to its stand of complying with Article 8 of
the Potsdam Proclamation. Id.
143. See generally id., Nov. 10, 1972, at 21; id., July 14, 1972, at 8.
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national disputes, China is adamantly opposed to submitting the question of sovereign control over the Senkaku Islands to a third party for
resolution, since the validity of Peking's claims to Taiwan would naturally arise. It seems quite clear that China will not allow a third
144
party to sit in judgment on this sensitive issue.
An InternationalRegime
Because of military and political considerations, the options of
armed force, negotiation, conciliation, and arbitration are, at best,
questionable alternatives in disputes involving both China and Taiwan;
consequently, reliance on an international regime to regulate exploitation of the resources of the Senkakus and the continental shelf emerges
as a theoretical possibility. As has been noted, a growing body of
world opinion supports establishing some form of international machinery under United Nations auspices to control exploitation of the
resources of the beds of the high seas.' 4 5 Prior to 1958, Japan actively promoted this idea, 4 6 and China has indicated its general support of the concept.14 7 However, since Peking claims exclusive sovereignty over a territorial sea and shelf of 200 miles, any agreed-upon
international regime would seemingly be forced to limit the exercise
of its control to areas outside of this limit. 4 8
Obviously, if a 200-mile territorial sea and continental shelf were
to be acknowledged by the world community generally, the provision
for an international regime would be useless in the East China Sea,
since the entire area would be claimed by bordering states; and negotiation, conciliation, or arbitration would again be the only possible
recourse. However, if China could be prevailed upon to accept a territorial sea and shelf of less than 200 miles, it would appear that an
international organ could be established to develop the resources of
the East China Sea.' 49 Participation by Japan and China in such an
144. It is interesting to note that no mention was made of the Senkaku Islands in
the Joint Statement issued by China and Japan although this matter had loomed as
such a major issue prior to the meeting. See id., Oct 6, 1972, at 12-13. Also,
the Chinese press has been strangely silent on this issue since the date of that agreement. This silence would seem to indicate that an understanding as to either the future disposition of these islands or the negotiability of the dispute was reached.
145. See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
146. See notes 51, 55, 57-58 supra and accompanying text.
147. See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
148. See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
149. China has been actively involved in the United Nations preparatory committees which have been producing drafts of conventions to be presented at the 1973
Conference on the Law of the Sea. The People's Republic has consistently chain-
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international organ would allow both countries to avoid the stigma
which might accompany a joint Japan-China development project
which ignored Taiwan. However, any such international body would
undoubtedly be required to deal with Taiwan's claims, a development
which would necessitate either participation in the international regime
by Taiwan or would require the organ to deal with China's claim of
sovereignty over Taiwan. Obviously, China would be unlikely to tolerate either alternative.
The difficulties in gaining acceptance by these Asian countries of
an authoritative international organ may be limited in significance,
however, since it seems unlikely that the proposed 1973 Conference
on the Law of the Sea will be able to effect a general consensus either
with respect to the limit of a state's territorial sea and continental shelf
or with respect to the structure of international machinery to exploit
the resources of the high seas. The present proposals are widely divergent and seemingly irreconcilable, largely because of the fundamental disagreement over the extent of a state's territorial sea and underlying shelf. 150 Given the unlikelihood that an international regime will
be established in the immediate future, the states bordering the East
China Sea might rely on a directly negotiated, joint-development program. It appears, however, that this alternative could be politically
hazardous for both China and Japan in light of both general world
opinion and the apprehensions of the smaller Asian nations who are
already wary of the economic designs of the two larger Asian coun5
tries.' '
CONCLUSION

In the final analysis, the economic desirability of immediately developing the natural resources of the East China Sea and the continental shelf surrounding the Senkakus must be balanced by the respective countries against delicate political considerations. China could decide to expand its pragmatic dealings with unrecognized states to include Taiwan, but this course of action seems improbable. A possibility remains that China will reach an accord with Taiwan after the
demise of Chiang Kai-shek, whereby Taiwan would become a locally
pioned the rights and proposals of the developing nations and has scored the superpowers for their attempts to limit the control of the proposed international regime. The
proposal for two more preparatory sessions prior to the beginning of the Conference
received China's unqualified approval. See, e.g., PEKING Rnv., Dec. 22, 1972, at 13;
id., Aug. 25, 1972, at 13.
150. See notes 42-44 supra and accompanying text.
151. See generally N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1972, § 2, at 44, cols. 1, 2.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1973:823'

autonomous province similar to Tibet and would share in the oil-development proceeds. 1 52

The probability of any such settlement is, of

course, completely speculative.
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, in turn, are unlikely to continue
with their current plan of jointly exploiting the resources of the East
China Sea, impervious to China's claims, especially after Japan's recent
recognition of China. China, Japan, and South Korea, therefore,
could agree to develop jointly the mutually shared continental shelf,
ignoring the claims of Taiwan and assuming that Taiwan would recognize the futility of successfully challenging such an alliance.
In any event, settlement of these disputes is not likely to be
reached by direct reliance upon the application of the customarily accepted principles of international law, nor by the use of at least one
of the more conventional modes of peacefully settling international disputes. As is readily apparent, the law itself at present is too unrefined
to provide the generally accepted guidelines needed for a settlement of
conflicting claims to the continental shelf. Referral of national claims
to an international tribunal or board of arbitration, as mandated by international law when an issue cannot be peacefully resolved by the
parties themselves, is a practical impossibility because of the political
question of China's sovereignty over Taiwan.
Despite these fundamental barriers, the parties to the dispute, including the People's Republic, have frequently utilized the rhetoric of
international law to buttress their respective claims to the continental
shelf and the various islands in question. The irony of this invocation
of international law is evident in the fact that there is apparently no
viable possibility of settlement through any of the standard procedures
of international law, other than through negotiations via the fiction of
"private parties." Nevertheless, it is significant that even the rhetoric
of international law is being employed. This conduct by the parties
indicates at least a recognition of the moral force of international law
152. See generally LEE 129. Tibet, along with the other locally autonomous provinces such as Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang, and Manchuria, actually enjoys little significant autonomy other than maintaining some of its traditional customs and social structure. However, should Taiwan and Hong Kong be returned to China's control, it is
likely that they will be accorded a greater degree of freedom to exploit the economic
capacities they presently maintain. China appears to be eminently pragmatic in its
economic dealings; and it would be unwise, to say the least, to dismantle the powerful
economic machines which presently exist in Taiwan and Hong Kong. Therefore, it is
probably safe to assume that these two areas would be accorded a greater degree of
economic freedom than any other area controlled by China.
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and the need for demonstrating the legitimacy and propriety of national
53

claims.1

153. China's tradition of pragmatic dealings with unrecognized states cannot be
ignored, especially since China has often successfully dealt with "private parties" to accomplish desired ends when the economic and practical realities so dictated. Therefore, it does not seem too unreasonable to anticipate that when China balances the
economic desirability of jointly exploiting the natural resources of the East China Sea
continental shelf against the political questions surrounding the status of Taiwan, the
pragmatic route of a joint venture controlled by "private parties," either with or without Taiwan's participation, will be selected.

I

